3ID COLT employment in OIF

FA Journal, March-June, 2004 by Benjamin M. Matthews, Captain A.J. Seidensticker

It was 24 March 2003, and the 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Reconnaissance Troop, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), was less than 100 kilometers from Baghdad. The day started with high winds and progressed into a shamal (sandstorm), reducing visibility to less than 100 meters. Ground surveillance radar (GSR) teams began to receive acquisitions of what appeared to be an unknown enemy force coming our way.

With visibility becoming limited, the level of security heightened, so the combat observation lasing team (COLT) pulled back into a tighter formation and established a hasty defensive position. The COLT platoon was task organized to the brigade reconaissance team (BRT), which also consisted of two scout platoons and two GSR teams. This was one way of integrating the COLTs and the BRT during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The COLT established observation posts (OPs) and manned all crew-served weapons, getting ready for whatever was coming.

As before morning nautical twilight (BMNT) approached, visibility continued to increase as the first spot reports were sent to the brigade fire support element (FSE). During the next two hours, visibility improved to almost three kilometers, and the COLT platoon began to acquire Iraqi reconnaissance elements.

Within the next two hours, the COLT destroyed two T-55 tanks, three BMPs and two technical trucks with Saddam Fedayeen fighters by employing indirect fire support from the 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery (1-41 FA).

Much has been written and discussed about how to employ COLTS most effectively--many battles have been fought at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, with COLTs task organized or not. Do the COLTs operate as an autonomous platoon? Are they attached or under the operational control (OPCON) of the BRT or some combination of both?

This article describes the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) the 3d Division developed in support of OIF based on its NTC rotation and reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) into Iraq for major combat operations (MCO). The division employed the TTPs during combat operations with much success.

The Plan. After NTC Rotation 03-02, the 3d Division changed the way it employed the COLT platoon. Previously, the COLT platoon was OPCON to the BRT but worked as a separate platoon. The new plan called for integrating the COLTs into the scout platoons--in essence, giving each scout section a COLT, providing the BCT commander a more direct form of fire support for the BRT.

The integration began shortly after the division arrived at Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait. TTPs and standing operating procedures (SOPs) were developed and trained. The concept for the integration was simple: integrate highly trained forward observers (FOs) with highly trained scouts, providing additional force protection and the capability to provide the brigade commander with timely, accurate and lethal fires.

The division broke the two scout platoons down into three sections, including a command and control ([C.sup.2]) section with two vehicles per section. Integrating a COLT into each scout section increased the section's vehicles from two to three.

In movement formations, the COLT vehicle positioned behind the lead scout vehicle of that section. This enabled each COLT to call-for-fire in the event of contact with enemy forces. The COLT gave each scout section an indirect fire support capability and gave the BCT commander "eyes forward" for early warning of enemy troop movements to shape the battlefield with indirect fires.

Integrating a COLT into the scout section provided the BRT a complementary effect: the scouts became another set of "eyes" for the acquisition of high payoff-targets (HPTs), and the COLTs made each scout section more lethal with the means to call-for-fire.

Using this TTP allowed the COLT platoon to make the most of the platoon leader's [C.sup.2] nodes, provide line-of-sight analysis for OP locations and expertise on the capabilities and limitations of fire support, and help clear fires and process fire missions. It also gave the troop commander a dedicated fire support officer (FSO)/fire support NCO (FSNCO) to synchronize artillery and close air support (CAS) in his scheme of reconnaissance or maneuver.

As part of RSOI in Kuwait, the scouts fielded the long-range acquisition scout system (LRASS). LRASS allowed each scout section to positively identify and engage targets out to 10 kilometers and observe targets out to 20 kilometers. The COLTs' ground/vehicular laser locater designator (G/VLLD) only could identify targets out to five kilometers and observe targets out to 10 kilometers. The LRASS enhanced COLT operations, virtually doubling the target acquisition range.

Execution. On 20 March, the BRT scouts and COLTs were on OPs ready to observe the initial artillery rounds of OIF. At 2000 hours, the ground war began with the COLTs and BRT scouts observing the first artillery rounds as they destroyed enemy OPs along the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. (See the map on Page 23.)