75th FA Brigade: SOSO in OIF and BCT at the NTC

FA Journal, March-June, 2004 by Vincent L. Price, Dale E. Owen, Richard L. Gonzales

On any given day, the 2,100 Soldiers of the 75th FA Brigade are preparing for National Training Center (NTC) rotations at Fort Irwin, California, Warfighters and other exercises designed to measure wartime readiness. However, combat operations and the increasing number and diversity of postwar stability operations and support operations (SOSO) are straining current readiness strategies.

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Success in modern warfare depends on "flexibility" and "the ability of units to conduct small unit and infantry type operations," according to the "Initial Impressions Report" of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) by the Combined Arms Assessment Team 01 (CAAT 01) from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The 75th FA Brigade's preparation, execution and postwar activities surrounding OIF underscore the need to reassess current force structures and capabilities. For an Army at war, units must not only be proficient in their traditional tasks, but also have instilled in Soldiers and leaders the flexibility to accomplish any mission.

After 11 September 2001, the 75th FA Brigade fought in major combat operations in OIF, transitioned to SOSO missions and sent elements to the NTC as a brigade combat team (BCT). Although executing combat operations in Iraq was within the bounds of the brigade's traditional mission, leading the military search for weapons of mass destruction (WMD), providing security and screening operations along the Iran-Iraq border, policing the battlefield and then serving as a BCT were all missions the 75th had never done before.

If recent operations are any indication, FA units will continue to be called upon to lead unique missions, partly because many of the traditional tasks become secondary in a SOSO environment. Thus, our continued success will depend on whether or not we can adapt and operate efficiently in the changing operational environment in places such as the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq.

In October 2002, the brigade was realigned with the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) (4th ID). The brigade headquarters participated in the 4th ID's mission rehearsal exercise (MRX) in preparation for the attack on Iraq from Turkey. With only a few weeks' notice, the 75th Brigade commander had to reassess, reorganize and reassign key personnel and equipment to facilitate interoperability and develop tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to support the Army's most modernized digital division.

As the MRX concluded, the brigade headquarters was directed to form the first task force (TF) ever to hunt for WMD during combat operations while still deploying 1st Battalion, 17th FA (1-17 FA) (Paladin) and 6-27 FA, a multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) battalion, to support the 4th ID. In less than 90 days, the brigade mission had evolved from reinforcing the 1st Cavalry Division, to reinforcing the 4th ID, to forming the Army's first sensitive-site exploitation (SSE) TF, known as "Exploitation TF." The brigade had about 60 days to form, train and deploy to Camp Udairi, Kuwait, while simultaneously deploying two battalions to execute autonomous missions in support of TF Iron Horse with the 4th ID.

Exploitation TF. The 75th FA Brigade established an intelligence exploitation base to fuse current and historical intelligence and provide command and control ([C.sup.2]) to eight weapons hunting teams searching for evidence of WMD in Iraq. Exploitation TF included Active and Reserve Components units and Coalition partners totaling more then 400 personnel. (See Figure 1.)

The unique organization included Soldiers and civilians from the 52d Explosive Ordnance Detachment, 1-147 and 1-159 Aviation Battalions, 87th Chemical Battalion, 513th Military Intelligence Brigade, various Coalition partners and teams of experts from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)--in addition to the Soldiers of the 75th FA Brigade.

Resembling a typical BCT headquarters, Exploitation TF included a Combined Joint Military Operations Center (CJMOC) as well as the traditional tactical operations center (TOC). The CJMOC consisted of intelligence, chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear (CBRN), explosive ordnance and technical escort experts. The CJMOC performed the centralized plans and intelligence functions, including conducting daily targeting meetings, providing tactical and technical SSE mission briefings and fusing intelligence.

The Exploitation TF commander directed SSE operations from the TOC. From there he also coordinated SSE missions with other major subordinate commands (MSC), directed logistical support and synchronized operations with the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), the theater command at Camp Doha, Kuwait. The CFLCC planned the majority of the deliberate SSE missions.

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Leadership, security, communications and medical personnel for the weapons hunting teams came from the 75th FA Brigade. Although a number of the brigade had backgrounds in special operations or other unique qualifications, the majority of the officers. NCOs and enlisted Soldiers had little expertise in conducting non-conventional operations. These Soldiers were the core of the US Army's TF hunting WMD.