4th ID: clearing airspace for counterfire in Iraq

FA Journal, March-June, 2004 by Michael Donahue, Carl F. Robinson

On a typical day in Iraq in the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Redlegs conducted raids, patrols and multiple flash checkpoints plus civil-military operations (CMO). At the same time, Field Artillerymen had to provide harassing and interdiction (H & I) fires and counterfire against an agile foe.

These fires occurred near airfields, helipads and air routes used by friendly aircraft from different divisions, service branches and nations within the Coalition. The aircraft often are unable to communicate with each other or units on the ground.

To safely fire under these conditions, the division fire support element (FSE) devised tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to leverage its digital equipment to provide the right fire support for operations in Iraq.

The Mortar Threat. With the threat of Coalition high-explosive (HE) shells incoming, the insurgents often set their mortar systems up days in advance and camouflaged them. This put the equipment at risk for early discovery by a Coalition patrol.

After shooting the mortar, the insurgents abandoned their equipment or moved it out as fast as possible before taking counterfire or getting killed or captured by a quick-reaction force (QRF).

All insurgent fire missions were shot without accurate meteorological data or accurate weapons and ammo data. Because of counterfire, insurgents were barely able to get first-round fires-for-effect (FFEs) off. So Soldiers serving in the Task Force (TF) Ironhorse area of operations (AO) were under the threat of mortar fires, but not adjusted mortar fire.

The AO for TF Ironhorse was noncontiguous with brigades, battalions and companies operating dispersed over a battlespace the size of Vermont. Terrorists often targeted logistics areas and forward operating bases (FOBs) with mortars because of the relative ease of using mortars against such fixed targets. This caused a need for indirect fire in an area commonly used by aircraft.

The traditional airspace coordination area (ACA) didn't apply because some aircraft in the area were just traveling though and had nothing to do with the operations. The trick was to keep "nonparticipating" aircraft out of the area.

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Airspace Control Measures (ACMs). The 4th Infantry Division FSE combined advanced FA tactical data system (AFATDS) geometries with ACMs to keep aircraft away from areas where there was a likelihood of indirect fire. The measures combined were the position area hazard (PAH), target area hazard (TAH) and restricted operating zone (ROZ).

Battalions conducted intelligence preparations of the battlefield (IPBs), selected likely targets and established a PAH/TAH over the area in AFATDS. In its simplest form, this is a circle with the firing unit in the center and a radius corresponding to the range the units are likely to fire. Although not typically considered fire support coordinating measures (FSCM), the PAH/TAH not only allowed the aircraft of TF Ironhorse to operate across the battlespace without having to worry about fratricide from artillery or mortars, but also facilitated rapid 6400-mil firing.

The division FSE and G3 air had to translate this geometry in AFATDS into a ROZ. This control measure is used by aviators and is not in AFATDS programming. The ROZ was used as a permissive FSCM akin to unit boundaries.

The ROZ was added to the airspace control order (ACO) from the Coalition Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), so all fixed-wing and helicopter pilots in the Iraqi theater could look at the ACO and avoid the ROZ and any danger of being shot down by friendly indirect fire.

Each artillery ROZ on the ACO had a point of contact (POC) from the FSE that established the ROZ, so aircraft that needed to fly into the ROZ could coordinate with the FSE. This allowed for the safe delivery of fires and cleared airspace. When ROZs overlapped with Class D airspace near airfields, the FSEs communicated with the aircraft control towers.

The safe delivery of fires was made easier by situational awareness (SA) from the division's digital equipment. AFATDS connectivity was essential and a great improvement over the lengthy voice transmissions of the FSCMs.

An additional tool TF Ironhorse FSEs used is My Internet Relay Chat (MIRC), a computer program to set up a civilian-style chat room. Brigade FSEs communicated via MIRC with relative ease among themselves, the division FSE and the Army airspace command and control ([A.sup.2][C.sup.2]) element. This greatly enhanced clearing fires and SA.

Another SA tool used is the automated deep operations coordination system (ADOCS) software. It displays the ACO and was used by the division FSE and aviation liaison officers (LNOs).

H & I fires suppressed enemy mortar strikes in Iraq. One TF Ironhorse brigade went from a mortar attack per night to none within a week after starting nightly H & I fires. The 4th Infantry Division FSE in Iraq carried on a long tradition of supporting its maneuverarms.

MAJ Michael Donahue

CPT Carl F. Robinson

Division FSE, 4th ID (Mech) in OIF