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Desert Fire: the Diary of a Gulf War Gunner
FA Journal, May-August, 2002 by Dr. James Jay Carafano
Andrew Gillespie, South Yorkshire, England: Leo Cooper, 2001. 248 Pages. ISBN 0-85052-7953. $25.86
This is a rare find--a book tailor-made for the professional development of young commissioned and noncommissioned officers.
Desert Fire is the personal story of Major Andrew Gillespie who commanded a battery of 155-mm self-propelled howitzers, part of the British 1st Armored Division during Operations Desert Shield and Storm. Although the work is titled a "Diary," the entries have obviously been polished and edited. Perhaps some of the immediacy of first impressions may have been lost or softened, but the trade-off has produced a competently written, highly readable text.
The great strength of this book is that it offers innumerable examples of the often mundane, but crucial challenges that consume junior commanders on operational deployments. Most striking is the importance of post-deployment training. Gillespie's account leaves little doubt that a battery trained to fight on the Rhine was ill-prepared for desert warfare.
If the ground battle had started on 27 December, the day his men arrived in theater, rather than almost two months later, the results would have been quite different. Some of the tasks--figuring out the ins and outs of desert navigation--were predictable. Others came as surprises. Forward observers had always assumed that directing artillery fire would be their primary task; however, in the desert, they found that directing close air support (CAS) and employing laser-guided munitions were just as, if not more important.
Gillespie's prewar days were filled with building and then training on makeshift ranges and conducting field training exercises. Preparations and training continued up to the final days before crossing the line of departure.
The diary is also excellent at illustrating the challenges of on-the-spot tactical innovation. Battery resupply depended on wheeled ammunition carriers that were totally unsuited to desert terrain. By trial and error, drivers discovered that by deflating their tires and maneuvering independently, rather than following in column as they had been taught and trained, they could compensate for their carriers' limited off-road capabilities. Such stories are gems of what good soldiers and leaders do when faced with new operational challenges.
About two-thirds of the book covers the deployment, preparations and post-conflict operations; the remaining one-third is a fine narrative of the lightning war. Maps and photographs are scattered throughout. There is a useful appendix and index as well. All of these add to the utility of Desert Fire as a professional development tool.
The best way to approach this work is not as a prescriptive roadmap for how to adapt to desert battle, but as a case study in how junior leaders respond to operational challenges at the tactical level. One technique would be to treat Gillespie's narrative like an after-action review, looking at what he saw as the problem, how he addressed it and what one might learn from his experience. In virtually every category--leadership, tactics, equipment, doctrine and organization--there are vignettes in his account worthy of debate and discussion.
Another point of departure might be a comparison between British and American operational methods. The differences between the two are well known. British battery commanders are far more senior than their US counterparts. During the battle, they go forward to act as observers, leaving their second in command to maneuver the guns. This text not only offers an opportunity to debate the merits of both systems, but also should prompt consideration of which system might serve best in the 21st century.
Despite all the innovations stemming from digital systems and other transformation initiatives, the structure and function of the basic fighting unit--the artillery battery--seems little effected.
Rethinking the role of the battery leadership and reconsidering what the critical command functions are and how they will be exercised in a range of military operations should consume young minds for a long time and prompt innovation and experimentation in every unit.
COPYRIGHT 2002 U.S. Field Artillery Association
COPYRIGHT 2008 Gale, Cengage Learning