How artillery beat Rommel after Kasserine

FA Journal, May-August, 2002 by Robert C. Baldridge

Lessons Learned. The 9th Div Arty's forced march and success at the Thala Battle provided many lessons for artillerymen that still hold true today.

Quality Leadership. An early 9th Division Commander was Major General Jacob Devers, later commanding general of the 6th Army Group in wartime Germany. The 9th's Commander in North Africa was Major General Manton Eddy, later 3d Army's XII Corps Commander in Germany and then commander of the reactivated US 7th Army in post-war Germany.

General Irwin and Lieutenant Colonel Westmoreland both had excellent training at the US Military Academy at West Point. Many others of the 9th Artillery, such as Colonel Alexander Patch of the 47th Infantry Regiment, later Commanding General of the 7th Army in wartime Germany, knew the value of leadership and training in making the 9th one of the war's premium divisions.

Practical Training. This proved to be of paramount importance. (16) Fortunately at Thala, the 9th Artillery had had more than its share of practical training. It was a regular army division and was manned by the early 1941 draftees who were the best America had to offer.

Training at night was obvious for fighters, but not so much for truck drivers. The 34th FA had many such night exercises in the states, including for its truck drivers. (17)

The night training helped in other ways. The Artillery needs the skills to recon and set up new firing positions quickly, especially at night. The Artillery can't just stop and fire effectively like a rifleman or tank can. (18)

In the states, C Battery, 84th Field Artillery conducted bore sighting training, even though it was considered unlikely the battalion would need this skill in combat. The instruments and methods were designed for 1,000 yards, but at Thala, the battalion needed its bore siting skills for short-range direct fire. (19)

Also while in the states, all ranks, officers and enlisted, were trained to be able to perform the jobs of their immediate supervisors in the 34th Field Artillery. Officers were required to know what went on at least two levels down. (20)

The 34th had practiced widening or closing the spread of a battery's four guns from the normal 200 yards to 800 yards, or even positioning guns next to each other, as conditions required. This practice is desirable in deserts, plains and mountains and useful at Thala. (21)

Massing Fires. It was only after Thala that the importance of massed firing was realized and understood and that a centralized (fire direction center) FDC was the way to control it. (22)

Forward Command Post--Irwin's locating at a good forward OP and making it his forward command post was a pivotal strategy at Thala. His tactics were in contrast to those of the Commander of the US II Corps, Major General Lloyd Fredendall, who located his command post 70 miles back in an underground mining bunker. (23) It sounds basic today, but the concept of having a command post so far forward was new then.

Allied Cooperation. The Allies cooperated at Thala Pass, consolidating their efforts to stop the German panzers. Today, our armed forces operate similarly under many types of command arrangements all around the world. (24)