Synchronizing lethal and nonlethal effects in 1/25 SBCT: lessons learned from NTC 01-03

FA Journal, July-August, 2004 by David M. Hamilton, Ryan C. Gist

On 6 October 2003, the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division Stryker Brigade Combat Team (1/25 SBCT) deployed from Fort Lewis, Washington, to the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California. The rotation was its first brigade-level training event on the path to its initial operational capability (IOC).

The focus of the training event was to conduct stability operations and support operations (SOSO) in a contemporary operational environment (COE) that reflected the current situation in Iraq. The training scenario combined the traditional characteristics of SOSO with elements of high-intensity conflict. This challenged the ability of the SBCT's fires and effects coordination cell (FECC) to employ its robust array of collection and delivery assets effectively throughout the area of operations (AO).

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This article describes tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) developed by the SBCT to synchronize lethal and nonlethal effects at the brigade and battalion levels as well as major lessons learned from the rotation.

Background Information. The NTC's notional country of Artesia that served as the AO included more than 1,000 multi-ethnic civilians. Individuals and entire towns were sensitive to the action or lack of action by the SBCT forces. A town that had been influenced positively would cooperate, offering information on known enemy locations, while a town that had been alienated would harbor terrorists, emplace improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or riot against SBCT forces.

Within the SBCT's area of responsibility (AOR), enemy strength was estimated at a battalion-minus with 300 insurgents, terrorists and former military. The enemy rarely wore uniforms and traveled in civilian vehicles, presenting a challenge common in the COE.

Terrorists and insurgents were focused on disrupting US efforts to establish a new Artesian government and rebuild the country. Their objective was to promote anti-US sentiments and cause a level of casualties unacceptable to the American public to force the SBCT to withdraw. Enemy tactics included frequently conducting mortar raids on static locations, emplacing IEDs, directly attacking SBCT platoons and squads, and intimidating the local populace.

The brigade commander recognized the need to conduct effects-based operations and that force alone could not set the conditions for the eventual withdrawal of US forces. This was evident in the brigade mission statement and intent. (See Figure 1.)

To meet the commander's intent, the brigade no longer could plan direct action and traditional nonlethal engagements as separate operations. Every mission--from a raid on a terrorist training camp to the reconstruction of local infrastructure--required the staff to synchronize lethal and nonlethal assets down to the company level to achieve success.

FECC and the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). The SBCT is uniquely equipped to meet the challenges of the COE. By doctrine, it can achieve the goal of "see first," "understand first," develop the situation out of contact and finish decisively. The challenge for the FECC at the NTC was to ensure that the brigade's diverse detection, delivery and assessment assets were focused on the effects specified in the commander's intent.

Unlike a conventional fire support element (FSE), the FECC is manned with lethal and nonlethal experts to conduct crisis effects planning in detail and exploit the SBCT's unique capabilities. The deputy effects coordinator (DECOORD) and information operations coordinator (IOCOORD) worked closely under the supervision of the effects coordinator (ECOORD) to synchronize lethal and nonlethal effects.

During the MDMP, the first critical synchronization step for the FECC was the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) huddle. The ISR huddle was conducted immediately after the mission analysis briefing to maximize the robust capabilities of the reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron.

The meeting focused the RSTA squadron's collection assets, including tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAVs), squad-level human intelligence (HUMINT) collectors, a ground surveillance radar (GSR), the long-range advanced scout sensor system (LRA[S.sup.3]) and the remotely monitored battlefield sensor system (REMBASS), to help the brigade develop the situation out of contact with the enemy. The DECOORD and air liaison officer (ALO) ensured the RSTA squadron was resourced with artillery and close air support (CAS), if contact was made.

At the conclusion of the huddle, the FECC had completed the "decide" and "detect" portions of the target synchronization matrix (TSM), the draft of the essential effects tasks (EETs) and effects warning order two (WARNO2). (See Figure 2 on Page 20.)

The organization of the SBCT staff allowed the FECC to produce a detailed effects plan in a compressed timeline. During course-of-action analysis, the FECC developed the method for accomplishing the lethal and nonlethal essential effects tasks.