Battlefield decisions of a battalion commander

FA Journal, July-August, 2004 by Billy F. Sprayberry

The payoff, however, was huge. The firing elements pushed forward with great speed and reached a future firing location within only hours of launching 42 Army tactical missile systems (ATACMS) in support of Coalition objectives, meeting the higher commander's intent.

This situation calling for a decision clearly was under circumstances outside the purview of SOPs, assumed the risk of never reconsolidating the battalion and was not covered in any guidance from any higher headquarters. The other option was to keep the unit together. Without the decision to task organize and accept some risk, the battalion would not have reached the firing area in time to support the maneuver forces. Success was possible for many of the considerations mentioned, not the least of which is knowing the personality and capabilities of the executive officer, who would ensure the logistics elements linked up with the battalion at the designated location, no matter what.

The up-and-out commander is unable to make this type of informed decision.

2. Every unit involved in OIF had to determine the value of equipment and ammunition versus the dangers to Soldiers left guarding non-functioning equipment. 2-4 FA was no exception.

Very soon after crossing into Iraq, an M88 recovery vehicle broke down. At 55 tons, nothing else in the battalion (except another M88) could recover the disabled vehicle. I decided to leave the non-mission capable M88 and conserve the three remaining for higher priority missions, specifically to recover our M270A1 launchers. No Soldiers remained to guard the downed M88; we abandoned it.

You would think that this was an easy decision, one that did not require the battalion commander's attention. But Soldiers are taught strict property accountability, and battery commanders spend much time in garrison accounting for property. Taking care of and accounting for their equipment is engrained in them from the very beginning of their service.

So, I had to make the decision and set the tone for the remainder of the operation. As 2-4 FA moved toward Baghdad and beyond, the battalion faced similar situations on many occasions. Some circumstances involved enemy vehicles disabled as a result of unexploded ordnance or vehicle accidents. The battalion abandoned non-mission capable HMMWVs, ammunition vehicles and trailers (still containing valuable ATACMS rounds), M577A3 command post vehicles and other trucks and trailers. We recorded the location of the vehicles for future recovery, if possible. But no Soldier remained behind to guard a vehicle.

This served to validate Soldiers as our most valued resource. It also was the right decision that had an unexpected positive impact. The valued Soldiers became more confident and more lethal. Soldier-accountability became an overt source of pride for the unit and the great senior NCOs of the battalion.

This same value of Soldiers is depicted dramatically in the 2002 film We Were Soldiers. In the movie, there is a scene when the brigade commander asks Lieutenant Colonel Moore, "Hal, how many men do you have battle ready, give or take?" Moore turns to his command sergeant major and then replies, "395 exactly." (7)