Battlefield decisions of a battalion commander

FA Journal, July-August, 2004 by Billy F. Sprayberry

After returning to Kuwait, 2-4 FA sent teams to all the locations at which we had abandoned equipment and ammunition. Some were recovered. We returned to the US without 14 vehicles and trailers and several ATACMS. However, we came back with every Soldier.

3. The morning after crossing through the Karbala Gap, 2-4 FA was arrayed along the north side of a very narrow, east-west paved road just north of Karbala. The firing elements were spread along the length of the road, approximately 15 to 20 kilometers. I felt the need to make personal contact with each battery commander and set out to "circulate on the battlefield." General Patton said, "The more senior the officer, the more time he has. Therefore, the senior should go to forward to visit the junior." (8)

This circulation was beneficial beyond making personal contact with subordinates; it allowed me to get a firsthand look at the area and situation. I found several destroyed enemy vehicles and personnel. I also discovered, what appeared to be, several small Bedouin encampments along the south side of the road.

In combination, these facts led to the possibility that some of the dead personnel could be from the suspicious looking camps. As night fell, retribution could be forthcoming in the form of attacks against the battalion. After returning to the command post, I directed the battalion operations officer to plan a move. The purpose was to put distance between the battalion and the potential threat from the camps. 2-4 FA began displacing as soon as we determined the new location.

That night, several other units in the area of the camps came under small attacks. It is not certain if these attacks were conducted by members of the "Bedouin" camps, but 2-4 FA was not the object of these attacks. The situation surmised prompted the decision to move the battalion. However, that decision would not have been possible without the solid relationship between myself and the brigade commander--my understanding of my flexibility and limitations.

4. Before crossing the Euphrates River into Baghdad, 2-4 FA's mission changed from general support (GS) to V Corps to GS reinforcing (GSR) to the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery. This change required us to place one firing battery in a position area cleared for ATACMS fire while the other batteries moved forward to fire rockets for the close fight. This left the ATACMS battery many kilometers away from any friendly force.

In an effort to increase security, the battery commander aggressively patrolled an area several kilometers outside the battery perimeter. One of these patrols discovered a cache of 160 cases of rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).

The battery sent an immediate request for emergency ordnance disposal (EOD) up the chain of command. The battery commander was concerned that, as night fell, it would be easy for one dissident to whisk away a couple of RPGs and fire them at the battery. This concern was further heightened by the deaths of three US Soldiers in an RPG attack the previous day. As the day progressed, it became apparent that EOD would not make it to the RPG cache.