World War I: Joint Fires in the East African Campaign - creative use of artillery in war

FA Journal, July, 2001 by Peter J. Williams

Current military thinking increasingly emphasizes "jointness" with leaders required to employ manoeuverist principles and "think outside the box." Some hold the view that these are relatively new developments--or at least have come to prominence only since 1945.

A study of a little known campaign in the First World War, far from the morass of the Western Front, puts this popular myth to rest. The innovative use of naval guns as land-based artillery in the 1914 East African Campaign is an example of joint fires that dispels the myth. One German commander, separated from his superiors by vast distances of time and space, was left with the freedom of action to prosecute a campaign in which he never was defeated, even though the British enemy consistently outnumbered his force. He was an artilleryman.

The Theatre of Operations. Before the outbreak of war in 1914, Germany had several African colonies: Cameroon, Togo, German South-West Africa (in the area of modern Namibia) and German East Africa (in the area of modern Tanzania). This article primarily is concerned with the latter. Germany was ceded these areas as part of the 1885 Congo Act between Germany, France, Britain and Belgium. A free-trade zone was established between the African colonies of the treaty signatories.

More importantly, the colonies agreed that during wartime, they would remain neutral. From the outbreak of war, the belligerent parties would have to refrain from hostilities in the neutralized territories and from using them as a base for warlike operations. [1]

German East Africa was vast, encompassing an area larger than France and Germany combined, a total of 384,000 miles. [2] A 3000-foot high plateau dominated its center. The northeast, toward British East Africa (modern Kenya) is primarily savannah with abundant wildlife. Mount Kilimanjaro, the highest mountain in the region, is in this area. Equatorial lands ring Lake Victoria, while the south is mainly highland. The campaign was fought mostly in typical "bush" country, ranging from open parkland to dense forests.

In many ways the theatre was a soldier's nightmare. One combatant described it as follows: "It's almost impossible for those unacquainted with German East Africa to realize the physical, transport and supply difficulties of the advance over this magnificent country of unrivalled scenery and fertility consisting of great mountain systems alternating with huge plains...the malaria mosquito everywhere...everywhere belts infested with the deadly tsetse fly which make an end of animal transport. In the rainy seasons, which occupy about half the year, the country becomes a swamp and military movements become impracticable." [3]

Indeed, nature proved as much a bane to military operations as the enemy. In the disastrous British engagement at Tanga in 1915, African bees helped rout their invading Indian troops and also put a German machine gun out of commission. [4]

In 1914, the population of German East Africa was approximately eight million, mostly made up of the 53 native tribes. The white population was mainly German settlers and numbered 5,336. [5]

German Forces. To protect their interests, the Germans had garrisons in their colonies. In German East Africa, this was the Schutztruppe (Protective Force) of 216 Europeans, 2,540 natives (known as Askaris) and 45 European police. In 1914, the Schutztruppe was organized into 14 independent companies, each consisting of three platoons of 60 men per platoon. At its wartime height, the Schutztruppe never exceeded 3,000 Europeans and 11,000 Askari.

Each company had German officers and two to four machine guns. Rifles were mainly of the 1871 pattern and fired black powder, a great disadvantage in the close fighting to come.[6]

The Schutzrruppe artillery firepower also was limited: 56 small-calibre, obsolete guns.[7] Two of the pieces dated back to 1873.

The German Commander. In 1914, Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, aged 45, commanded the Sclzutztruppe. Originally trained as an artillery officer, he also had served with a marine battalion. Although he was nominally the senior commander, the Governor of German East Africa, Dr. Schnee, was the de facto commander-in-chief of the colonial armed forces. While Dr. Schnee hoped to keep his territory neutral in the forthcoming war in accordance with the 1885 treaty, von Lettow-Vorbeck believed this was not the best course of action for Germany. Realizing where the British center of gravity lay, he summarized his philosophy as follows: "My view was that we would best protect our colony by threatening the enemy in his own territory. We could very effectively tackle him at asensitive point, the Uganda Railway." [8]

In a letter to Governor Schnee, he further stated his case: "We have it in our power to hinder the enemy by sheltering our navy in its campaign against enemy transports and by keeping as many troops as possible pinned down in Africa. The Schutztruppe, under my command is ready to do anything in its power to help win the war."[9]