Spanish Civil WAr: The German Kondor Legion A Firepower Force Package in Combat

FA Journal, July, 2001 by Prisco R. Hernandez

Effective Targeting is essential for success. The targeting process is central to the effectiveness of a firepower force package. The present targeting model of decide, detect, deliver and assess is a useful guideline for employing decisive fires.

Firepower is always a limited resource. Therefore, it is imperative that fires be employed against high-payoff targets (HPTs). A firepower force package is most effective when used in general support of the maneuver force. In this way, the firepower force commander will have better control over his fires and can more effectively support the operational goals of the supported maneuver commander.

The firepower force package must continue to train while in theater. The success of the Kondor Legion was possible only by its continuous training while in an operational environment. Working with an immature doctrinal framework and constrained by the politically sensitive nature of their operations, the legion's officers and NCOs created and adjusted doctrine as well TTP, literally, "on the fly."

This was especially evident in the rapid development of TTP for employing the 88-mm FLAK gun in roles for which it was not designed and the development of the Rotte and Schwarm air attack formations. [45] (This approach was indicative of the German military's way of doing business throughout the entire first half of the 20th century.)

Such in-theater training has been conducted by the US Army in places such as Normandy, when the invention of the plow tank by a US Army sergeant led to platoon-level hedgerow breaching techniques. More recently, US mechanized units practiced breaching operations in-theater in preparation for Operation Desert Storm in the Gulf.

Constant review and evaluation of emerging TTP is critical and may mean the difference between success and failure in combat. This validates the importance of the AAR and points toward its continued implementation in-theater. Furthermore, the lessons learned must be quickly disseminated throughout the force with a minimum of bureaucratic interference. The TTP developed in Spain were implemented immediately and did not wait for official approval from authorities in Germany. The Kondor Legion seized tactical opportunities as they occurred. If a weapons system or TTP proved effective, its use was rapidly approved and the lessons learned were quickly disseminated throughout the force. This, in turn, shaped the way in which the entire force would be employed in the future.

Tactical air power is no substitute for Field Artillery, a lesson the Germans failed to appreciate in the relatively unsophisticated Spanish theater. The lack of artillery forced them to use the He-51 and Stuka for DS and SEAD, roles in which Field Artillery is better suited. Similarly, they used the 88-mm FLAK as FA in a direct fire mode. The legion's success in Spain could not be duplicated a few years later when facing the Soviet juggernaut and the combined arms might of the Allies in Europe.

A firepower force package is most effective when used as a complement to, not a substitute for conventional ground forces-perhaps the greatest lesson of the German experience in Spain. The success of the legion in Spain comes with a strategic-level caveat. It is tempting to pursue policy by use of a firepower force package; however, as was the case in Spain, a firepower force is most effective when used in support of ground maneuver forces.