The FA and the Objective Force—an uncertain but critical future

FA Journal, Sept-Oct, 2002 by Michael D. Major General Maples

We are an Army at war. We are also an Army postured for significant change. Both of these conditions inevitably bring uncertainty to our view of the future.

In my last article, I stated the Field Artillery is absolutely essential today to the success of our joint forces and the Army's combined arms team and that the Field Artillery, fully integrated with joint fires and all other effects-producing systems, will be even more critical in the future. I want to reinforce that message.

As we consider the directions our nation may take in the near term to achieve our objectives in the Global War on Terrorism, we can anticipate the vital role the fires of the Field Artillery may play. The potential for employing ground forces in the war combined with the recent completion of two Congressionally mandated indirect fires studies and the Maneuver Unit of Action (UA) Operational and Organizational Concept (O&O) only reinforce that current and future forces will remain dependent on indirect fires and that the Field Artillery has a critical role to play in both.

The Need for Maneuver and Fire Synergy. In today's rapidly changing contemporary operating environment (COE), there is an unprecedented need to achieve true synergy between fires and maneuver. Fires and maneuver have an empowering relationship on the battlefield, each complementing the other in contributing to the achievement of decisive outcomes. A commander may employ his maneuver force to attain positions of tactical advantage in order to most effectively employ his fires. In other circumstances, it may be the effects of fires that will permit the effective maneuver of forces. From positions of tactical advantage, a commander can employ accurate, destructive fires against high-value targets to eliminate enemy combat capabilities.

The effectiveness of our fires will present a dilemma to our adversary. He either will have to remain in position and continue to suffer the effects or move in an attempt to reduce the vulnerability of his position. By moving, the enemy risks exposing his force to exploitation by ground maneuver and the effects of joint and land-based fires. In either event, the position of advantage gained by maneuver enables fires to be employed to achieve the destructive effects that lead to tactical decision.

Expectations of Fires. The Army requires fires that are immediately responsive and continuously available in all types of terrain and weather. While we expect to derive full effects from the fires of joint and coalition capabilities as well as the tremendous firepower afforded by Army aviation, these capabilities cannot ensure the fulltime, full-spectrum requirements of maneuver forces are met.

The Army must have an organic ability to deliver fires in a fully networked architecture: destructive fires, both point and area; protective and suppressive fires in the required quantity and duration; and special munitions, such as obscurants, illumination, and obstacles.

Before forces are joined, the increased long-range killing capability of fires will fix and destroy the enemy. By achieving greater destruction at standoff, we can ensure freedom of action and reduce the need to rely on tactical assault to achieve decisive outcomes. Long-range fires will dislocate, disintegrate or destroy the enemy, creating the opportunity for maneuver to transition to exploitation or move to other positions of advantage.

Once contact occurs, fires must be fully integrated in support of maneuver. Fires must be continuously available on demand, tailorable to mission requirements and scaleable to achieve the effects desired. Fires will continue to be employed against planned targets; however, we must significantly improve our ability to attack targets of opportunity to respond to the needs of forces at the lowest tactical level.

Fires generally will be categorized into three primary purposes: destructive, protective and suppressive, and special purpose fires. See Figure 1 for the definitions of those purposes.

Mix of Capabilities. Our future fire support system will require a mix of capabilities, including the full range of joint fires and indirect fire systems. Missiles, rockets, cannons and mortars as well as fixed-wing aircraft and attack helicopters all offer unique capabilities and, likewise, have system-specific limitations that must be understood and considered.

For ground forces, a mix of mortar, cannon, rocket and missile systems clearly provides the greatest flexibility and mitigates the individual shortcomings of each delivery means. The strength of our future fire support system will be the ability to employ this mix of capabilities, enabled by networked command, control communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance ([C.sup.4]ISR).

A Continuing Need for Cannon Artillery. The Army clearly has articulated the need for a cannon as an integral component of this fires system to provide immediately responsive, continuously available fires to our maneuver units for the foreseeable future.