JCAS and The Defense of Duffer's Wadi

FA Journal, Sept-Oct, 2004 by D. Matthew Neuenswander, D. Wayne Andrews

This article updates E.D. Swinton's book The Defense of Duffer's Drift written about combat in the Boer War and printed in the US in 1905. Like its predecessor, the article outlines a series of dreams of a main character in combat--in this case, a captain in command of a Stryker company who is tasked with the defense of a key piece of terrain, Duffer's Wadi. A "wadi" is a valley, gully or riverbed that remains dry except during the rainy season.

Reminiscent of Duffer's Drift, the main character makes mistakes in the first dream that result in disaster for him and his unit. In his subsequent dreams, he learns from his previous mistakes until he finally is successful in accomplishing his mission. Unlike Duffer's Drift, this article focuses on a single mission area: the ground commander's use or misuse of fires, specifically, joint close air support (JCAS).

The lessons the captain learns in these dreams are actual lessons gleaned from Air Warrior I and II after-action reports (AARs). Air Warrior I is the USAF exercise flown in support of brigade combat team (BCT) rotations at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California. Air Warrior II is the USAF exercise flown in support of BCT rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana.

In the article's scenario, the enemy is referred to as the "Feyadeen." The battle could have taken place last year or will take place five years from now somewhere in the Middle East or Afghanistan. The Feyadeen consists of both regular forces with conventional weapons, such as tanks, BMPs, mortars, surface-to-air missiles and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and irregular forces with non-conventional weapons, such as car/truck bombs, technical vehicles, suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The Feyadeen are fanatics committed to driving all American and allied forces from their country despite the fact that their nation is in the process of building a fledgling democracy.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

Prologue. The dust had just cleared from the last C-17 leaving the airfield as my company XO [executive officer], and I walked up to the tent that served as the battalion command post [CP], known as the TOC [tactical operations center]. It was the last day of October, and my company was one of two that had been airlifted to an abandoned airfield in the middle of nowhere as part of Operation Vigilant Foresight. Portions of a Ranger battalion had parachuted into this airfield that the Russians had built in the 1970s and secured it as our future SBCT [Stryker BCT] FOB [forward operating base].

The rest of my brigade would begin arriving early tomorrow morning. For now, it was up to my company and one other company in my Stryker battalion and the Rangers to hold the FOB and airfield for the night. Fortunately, we had about six hours until the sun went down to figure out what was going on.

Inside the TOC, my battalion CO [commanding officer] was looking over a map with the S3 and the Air Force master sergeant who served as the EBALO [enlisted battalion air liaison officer]. The EBALO was in charge of the single TACP [tactical air control party] we were able to get on the C-17s today. The rest of the USAF team and equipment would arrive tomorrow with the brigade TOC. My CO looked at me and pointed to a wadi on the map 20 kilometers due west of the airfield.

"We don't expect any trouble from the Feyadeen tonight, but if they come, it most likely will be from here, Duffer's Wadi," he said as he pointed to the map. (See Figure 1 on Page 6.)

"Move your company to Duffer's Wadi, establish a hasty defensive position and hold until relieved." The CO also told me that only three of the unit's 155-mm M198 howitzers had arrived and ammo was very limited. He sent the other company several kilometers east to block the eastern approach to the airfield.

"The ASOC [air support operations center] said they will give us the CAS we need," the CO said, "so take your FIST [fire support team] and company mortars with you and make sure you check in with the signal officer before you leave.

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

"I don't have a TACP to send with you out west; we will run any CAS you need out of the battalion TOC until tomorrow. As soon as you get out there, radio back any preplanned CAS requests. Unless you have any questions, you and your men can get going," he finished.

My mind was jumping ahead to the myriad of things I had to do--orders to give, develop a plan for how to defend the wadi--so I told the CO, "We got it!" and left the TOC.

As I walked to the commo tent, the EBALO caught up with me and asked if I wanted to take an Air Force JTAC [joint terminal air controller] assigned to the Ranger battalion with me. The JTAC's unit had not arrived yet. Apparently, he was a combat veteran, had lots of great gear and was willing to support my company for the next 24 to 36 hours.

My unit had trained hard together for months before this mission, and I did not want to baby-sit some new guy if things got Hot. I politely declined the EBALO's offer and went to see a man about commo.