The brigade staff's JCAS battle drill

FA Journal, Sept-Oct, 2004 by James A. Frick

Joint close air support (JCAS) is a combat multiplier for the brigade, which, along with some of the ground force's indirect fires, is one of the few lethal shaping means that can range beyond six kilometers of the forward line of own troops (FLOT). Therefore, the entire brigade staff should take ownership of employing JCAS on the battlefield and integrate all brigade assets with JCAS assets to ensure the success of this very capable means.

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However, the trend for the past several years at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, is brigade staffs are poorly trained in the execution of CAS. This is one reason the NTC has focused on the crawl-walk-run training model for CAS, now called joint effects training (JET). (See the article "CAS Training at the NTC" by Lieutenant Colonel Mark L. Waters and myself in the March-June 2004 edition.)

The Problem. No doubt our terminal air controllers are trained in talking fixed-wing aircraft onto a target, which many of our manuals discuss in detail. Where units fail to employ CAS effectively is at the brigade and task force staff levels. In those staffs, battlefield operating system (BOS) representatives lack the know-how and battle drills for executing their responsibilities during CAS.

Our fire support manuals do not provide a complete doctrinal how-to of CAS integration for a battle staff. FM 3-09.4 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) for Fire Support for Brigade Operations is more focused on terminology with some coordination considerations for employing CAS. FM 3-09.30 TTPs for Observed Fire and Fire Support at Battalion Task Force and Below has more on executing CAS but from an observer-to-pilot perspective.

The newly signed Joint Publication 3-09.3 Joint TTPs for Close Air Support (3 September 2003) provides the most detailed discussion about CAS planning, preparation and execution. It lays out critical execution information on airspace management, the synchronization of CAS and indirect fires, release authority, tactical risk assessment and target engagement. But even that excellent manual does not outline the brigade/task force staff requirements by BOS to execute CAS.

Our weapon systems normally have crew drills in which each member has a specified task or set of tasks for sending munitions down range. Many brigade battle staffs don't have a battle drill for CAS or one they have rehearsed. Normally, the air liaison officer (ALO) and fire support officer (FSO) are the only staff members focused on the request and distribution of aircraft during the fight. This leads to the unit's having the asset available but not focusing it properly.

CAS is often sent deep to perform a reconnaissance role, which may be an inefficient use of the platform--depending on the type of aircraft and the attitude and speed at which it is flying and whether or not the enemy is moving. When sent deep to recon, CAS can be committed into airspace not cleared of indirect fires and without a notification/situational awareness provided to friendly air defense artillery (ADA) systems.

Staff Battle Drill. Executing CAS should involve the entire staff. There must be constant cross-talk among the fire support element (FSE), tactical air control party (TACP) and S2 shop as well as among the staff, brigade commander and his fire support coordinator (FSCOORD).

Once on station, CAS is flexible. If there is a confliction in airspace and indirect ground fires are the priority, the staff must be prepared to shift CAS vertically or laterally until the airspace is clear. If CAS is on-station and there is no brigade target identified, the staff should consider distributing CAS down to the task force with the main effort. If the staff identifies a brigade target but has no CAS, it must send an immediate request through Air Force channels.

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The staff must be searching constantly for threats that would limit the use of CAS and recommend supporting solutions, such as suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) with indirect fires or jamming enemy command and control nets.

Bottom line: these processes all come down to the staff's executing a CAS battle drill.

The S2 brings to the staff's attention a high-priority target identified by division and brigade collection assets. Led by the executive officer (XO), the staff determines the need for directing CAS on to the target and recommends this action to the brigade commander.

The FSO follows up with his recommendation to the FSCOORD. The FSO coordinates with the FA battalion for SEAD and marking rounds. The S3 air, ALO and FSO work together to deconflict airspace with all current users. The military intelligence commanding officer (MICO) works with the staff to determine where and when he needs to be jamming command and control nodes (the brigade does not have assets to jam ADA radars; however, its assets can jam the frequencies that enemy ADA units are talking on). This, in turn, may disrupt the enemy's ability to give early warning to shoulder-fired systems.