Echeloning Fires: Breaking Bad Training Habits

FA Journal, Nov-Dec, 2001 by Scott G. Wuestner

Over the years, many articles have been written about echeloning fires. Most Field Artillery Fire Supporters and their Infantry brethren can recite the 6-5-4-3 rule. This rule (in hundreds of meters) refers to the minimum safe distances (MSDs) outlined in "AR 385-63 Safety Policies and Procedures for Training, Target Practice and Combat" that units employ during danger-close live fires. The rule applies to units' using MSDs to echelon fires--step rounds closer to friendly troops: 155-mm, 105-mm, 81-mm and, finally, 60-mm munitions.

In their March-April 1997 article "Risk Estimate Distances for Indirect Fire in Combat," Major Gerard Pokorski and Lonnie R. Minton sought to refine these distances by determining risk estimate distances (REDs) for combat conditions. The article provided excellent data in terms of the probability of rounds' incapacitating soldiers at the various ranges, called probability of incapacitation (PI). The REDs derived were based on the fragmentation pattems of the different weapons.

However, one critical assumption about the RED data was not emphasized in the article--and is a problem today. The article says, "The distances assume that the firing unit has had its fires adjusted onto the target by an observer" [I added the emphasis].

A combination of the misuse of REDs, an AR 385-63 safety procedure mentality (6-5-4-3 rule) and a lack of understanding or application of the five requirements of accurate, predicted fire have led to flawed tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for echeloning fires. This article outlines the impact these failings have on the accuracy of rounds and what units can do about it.

Risk Estimate Distances. For whatever the reason, units fail to meet the major assumption upon which REDs were developed--adjust the rounds landing at those REDs.

During offensive operations at the Joint Readiness Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana, mortars and artillery seldom are adjusted onto the target prior to an attack. Leader recons rarely are conducted, and forward observers (FOs) very rarely are left in position to watch over the objective in order to adjust the initial rounds of a preparation. During defensive operations, we achieve only a 20 to 30 percent success rate in adjusting rounds on single targets tied to obstacles.

In the September-October 1999 edition, the Chief of Infantry Major General Karl F. Ernst in his article "Is the FA Walking Away from the Close Fight" stated, "By changing between weapon systems as the distance between the friendly force and the enemy is reduced, the maneuver force is essentially assaulting behind a 'wall of steel'..." If rounds have not been adjusted onto a target, then REDs don't apply and our current methodology of using the effects radius to echelon fires is invalid.

Five Requirements of Accurate, Predicted Fire. The five requirements are 1. Accurate target location and size, 2. Accurate firing unit location, 3. Accurate weapon and munition information, 4. Accurate meteorological (Met) information and 5. Accurate computational procedures. These requirements are critical to assuring that fires are accurate and predictable and critical to the principle of mass that preparatory fires are based on. Nevertheless, they are not addressed in our current echelonment TTP. For more information, see the article "How to Meet the Five Requirements for Accurate, Predicted Fire (And What to Do If You Can't)" by Captain Christopher A. Patton, September-October 1998, Page 22; you can access the article on line at sill-www.army.mil/famag at "Previous Editions."

Mortar Inaccuracies. Mortars inherently are not as accurate as cannon artillery. Our fixation on the effects radius has blinded us to many problems with mortars and their firing accuracy. At the JRTC, we commonly see the following errors with mortars in the indirect fire mode.

First, mortars rarely account for the error that occurs when they settle their base plates. Mortars must first settle their base plates for two to three rounds before they can fire accurately. Such errors can cause rounds to fall as much as 200 meters short of the target. This fact has not been factored into the echeloning fires model.

Second, mortars don't do a good job of consistently updating their Met data. Air temperature, air density, wind direction and wind speed all affect the lighter mortar round, thus mortars fail to compensate for nonstandard conditions.

The weight of the round makes a difference. The artillery's most accurate shooter is the 155-mm howitzer firing a 95-pound projectile. The 81-mm mortar round weighs 9.5 pounds while the 60-mm mortar round weighs only 4.5 pounds. Mortar rounds are affected significantly more by the effects of meteorological conditions than the heavier 155-mm projectile or the 33-pound 105-mm round.

Third, mortar systems rarely are provided the survey required for common direction to each firing unit. This, again, directly impacts our ability to mass all systems at the required time and space.