Junior Officers: The Thinning Ranks

FA Journal, Nov-Dec, 2001 by Colonel Lawrence H. Saul

The Army faces a growing crisis as increasing numbers of junior officers are opting to leave the Army. (See Figure 1.) In the mid- to late- 1990s and the early part of this new century, captains are choosing to return to civilian life rather than pursue careers as professional Army officers with alarming regularity. Junior officer retention has become a source of great concern for the Army.

A number of studies, results from field interview teams and research groups have identified several reasons as to why these potential senior leaders are leaving the Army. By leaving, they are voicing their dissatisfaction with current trends in the Army.

This article looks at two areas of concern that have an impact on junior officer retention: the Army's zero defects mentality and the generation gap; it then discusses mentoring and counseling, two programs that need emphasis to help stem the loss of the Army's future senior leaders.

Background. In the autumn of 1989, the Berlin Wall fell; its demise had the greatest impact on our Army in decades. The one tangible symbol of hostility between the West and the Soviet Union was gone.

As a result of the lessened threat from the Warsaw Pact, the Army was downsized from nearly 800,000 to less than a half million. We no longer had the requirement to maintain such a large standing army, an army awaiting the Red Horde's impending invasion of West Germany. The Soviets no longer posed a credible threat to Western Europe.

The hue and cry for a "peace dividend" could not be ignored. Pressing domestic social requirements dictated a dramatic reduction in defense budgets. The Pentagon was forced to downsize.

The force reduction imposed on the Army took out more troops, in terms of percentages, than some of our most calamitous battlefield disasters. Whole cohorts were decimated. Some year groups were targeted for major reductions and, at the same time, new cohorts were under assessed from the commissioning sources. These knee-jerk decisions laid the foundation for future problems.

The debate on the effectiveness of the management of the drawdown, in terms of how personnel actions were executed, continues; however, what is not debatable is the effects these methods have had on contemporary attitudes, especially those soldiers who remained on active duty.

This huge drawdown has affected the culture of the Army in many profound ways. We have witnessed dramatic changes in how we do business.

Some Challenges. Some changes have been negative. The Army has become staid, overly cautious and unforgiving. Among the reasons for these problems are the Army's adoption of zero defects and the conflicting values between generations.

Zero Defects. This mentality fosters an unforgiving attitude that allows no mistakes. Commanders are so consumed with not failing that they micro-manage virtually all aspects of operations, allowing their subordinates no opportunities to make mistakes and learn from them. Subsequently, when mistakes are made, "heads roll."

Working in such an environment is destructive to the morale of soldiers and contrary to the positive goals of leader development. It causes a ripple effect that is felt throughout the ranks.

For junior officers, this has had the chilling impact of encouraging them to take the less risky route--be overly cautious and not "rock the boat." Being so cautious has caused the undesired effect of stifling initiative.

Seizing the initiative is one of the cornerstones of our warfighting doctrine. As written in FM 100-5 Operations (1993, Page 2-6), initiative "requires a willingness and ability to act independently within the framework of the higher commander's intent" (emphasis added). As the new FM 3-0 Operations hits the field, we need to look at the updated definition: "From an individual perspective, initiative is the ability to be a self-starter, to act when there are no clear instructions or when the situation changes."

Of course, the key issue here is ability. A zero defects commander does not allow his subordinates the ability to act on their own accord.

The worst thing we can do as we transform the Army is create an officer corps that is timid--a corps of leaders who fear taking action. Some would say we're already there. In environments that foster this attitude, all too often, good officers, the risk takers, perish.

We just now are seeing the second and third order effects of this egregious situation. We have seen many dedicated and talented young officers leave the service prematurely, often as a result of the zero defects attitude. We can ill afford to lose our future senior leaders while they are still in their formative years.

It is a fact: the success of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf in 1990 and 1991 was the result of 25 years of rebuilding, training and dedication. The reason we were successful was due, in part, to the positive climate that existed in the Army between 1981 and 1991.

During this decade, we underwent a transformation that took the post-Vietnam US Army from demoralization and despair to the awesome force that devastated the Iraqi Army. However, many of the young men and women who commanded platoons and companies and helped win this victory have decided to leave active duty rather than continue to serve in an organization they see as wracked with poor morale, stifling leadership techniques and a culture of zero defects.