The Dragon Strikes: China and the Korean War: June-December 1950

Infantry Magazine, Jan-April, 2000 by Michael F. Davino

The Dragon Strikes: China and the Korean War: June-December 1950. By Patrick C. Roe. Presidio Press, 2000. 466 Pages. S34.95.

In late November 1950, the United Nations Command launched what became known as the "Home for Christmas" offensive. Despite an earlier clash with Chinese Communist Forces that had left a regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division bloodied in the Eighth U.S. Army zone and a Marine regiment's defeat of a Chinese division in the X Corps zone, the UN Command attempted a massive attack to reunify the Korean peninsula. Within a month, the Eighth Army had been defeated by the Chinese and was withdrawing below the 38th parallel where the war began. In the X Corps zone, the 1st Marine Division had to break out from encirclement and was evacuated by sea to Pusan with the rest of X Corps. In the words of author Patrick Roe, the course of history was changed.

The Dragon Strikes is a close study of the Chinese involvement in the first six months of the Korean War. It is an excellent account and a timely one. Its publication coincides with the 50th anniversary of the war and a time when the potential threat China poses to the United States is under increasing scrutiny.

Patrick Roe, who served as the intelligence officer of a Marine rifle battalion in the Chosin Reservoir campaign, examines in great detail both the Chinese actions against the U.S. X Corps in Northeastern Korea and the defeat of the U.S. Eighth Army at the Chongchon River. He reviews the pre-war situation and analyzes why the Chinese chose to enter the conflict. He covers the deception plan of the Chinese, explaining how they were able to intervene in such a decisive manner while remaining undetected by U.S. intelligence services.

Unlike many authors who tend to hold General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and his G-2, Major General Charles Willoughby, almost solely responsible for the disastrous campaigns in north Korea, Roe describes the role of the Joint Chiefs, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council in the debacle. He explains the complex chain of events that had the national command authorities on the verge of panic, and unable to issue firm orders to MacArthur.

This book will give readers interested in the Korean War an excellent understanding of how the Chinese were able to defeat a technologically superior enemy. It is an excellent addition to the literature available on the so-called "Forgotten War."