MacArthur and the American Century: A Reader; and MacArthur's War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero

Infantry Magazine, Spring, 2002 by Cole C. Colonel Kingseed

MacArthur and the American Century: A Reader. Edited by William M. Leary. Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2001. 522 Pages. $40.00, Softbound.

MacArthur's War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero. By Stanley Weintraub. Simon & Schuster, 2001. 385 Pages, Softbound. Audio tape (ISBN: 07435-0535-2), $25.00. Reviewed by Colonel Cole C. Kingseed, U.S. Army, Retired.

No American general in the 20th century has generated more controversy than General of the Army Douglas A. MacArthur. In a military career spanning five decades, MacArthur was the preeminent combat general of World War I, the resourceful commander of the Southwest Pacific theater in World War II, and the enigmatic Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan at the outset of the Korean War. Following his abrupt dismissal from command by President Harry S Truman, MacArthur returned to the United States amid a tumult reminiscent of that of a Roman emperor two millennia ago. Two recent books explore the contentious general who was both reviled and deified by millions of his fellow soldiers and countrymen.

In MacArthur and the American Century, editor William M. Leary has compiled a comprehensive anthology of essays that address virtually every phase of MacArthur's remarkable career, with World War I being the notable exception. Contributors include renowned historians: Stephen E. Ambrose, D. Clayton James, and Russell Weigley, as well as the general himself, whose essays and speeches provide contemporary insight into the man and his times. To his credit, Leary also includes a separate section that not only places MacArthur's illustrious career in perspective, but also takes his numerous biographers to task for presenting MacArthur in an overly subjective light, virtually ignoring the general's frequent lapses into egotism and insubordination. Still, one cannot read this anthology without reaching the conclusion that Douglas MacArthur imprinted his personality, for better or worse, on both the U.S. Army and the American century.

One essay merits special scrutiny. Barton F. Bernstein of Stanford University reexamines American policy during the Korean War in light of new documentary evidence, and concludes that the relationship between MacArthur and Truman was far more complex than originally viewed. Given recently declassified documents concerning the Truman Administration's position on bombing across the Yalu, the attitude of the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations toward atomic war in the Pacific, and the Eisenhower Administration's uneasiness about the armistice, Bernstein demands additional scholarly research into the conduct of the Korean War. Discussion concerning the use of the atomic bomb, for example, is clearly revealed in Joint Chiefs of Staff documents as early as November 1950. Bernstein also states that despite Truman's claim that he despised MacArthur long before the spring of 1951, he hesitated to remove him from command; he was deterred chiefly by his fears of provoking a political battle at home that would further aid the Republican Party in attacking the administration's unclear China policy.

In contrast to Leary's balanced assessment of MacArthur, Stanley Weintraub joins an increasing number of historians who paint a highly unflattering portrait of his controversial subject. In an attempt to remember the Korean War's first eleven months, which he dubs "MacArthur's war," Weintraub begins his study of the war with MacArthur's triumphant return to the United States following his abrupt dismissal from command by Truman, then back-pedals to the events foreshadowing North Korea's premeditated attack on its southern neighbor on 25 June 1950. The MacArthur who emerges from these pages is an egotistical field commander, unwilling to consult with the Pentagon; an indecisive general reluctant to confront bad news; and an imperial shogun, completely out of touch with the combat readiness of the troops entrusted to his command.

Like Michael Schaller's Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General, Weintraub leaves no stone unturned in his attempt to discredit MacArthur. "More glorious than the Cote-de-Chatillon in 1918 or Leyte in 1944 was Inchon," which Weintraub credits as much to luck and prior contingency planning as to MacArthur's alleged military genius. Particularly galling to the author is MacArthur's efforts to run his war, except for photo-opportunity flying visits, from 700 miles away in Japan.

Weintraub is equally critical of MacArthur's principal subordinates, the "unsteady" Walton Walker, commanding Eighth Army, and the "incompetent and abrasive" Ned Almond, commanding X Corps, as well as the senior Army leadership at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level. Both Chairman Omar Bradley and Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins seem weak and unwilling to confront MacArthur, who had been Army chief of staff when Bradley and Collins were junior officers. Only Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway receives high marks from Weintraub for his success in restoring Eighth Army's fighting spirit after the disaster on the Yalu and its subsequent retreat south of the 38th Parallel.