Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide: May 1965 to October 1966

Infantry Magazine, Spring, 2002 by Joe P. Dr. Dunn

Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide: May 1965 to October 1966. By John M. Carland. U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2000. 410 Pages. $43.00. Reviewed by Dr. Joe P. Dunn, Converse College.

The United States Army Center of Military History produces excellent work, and this eighth volume in the Vietnam series is another outstanding contribution. The volume focuses on the first 18 months of action as the United States changed its mission from advisory to combat operations. Chronologically, it is the first of four Vietnam battle histories.

By March 1965, Communist forces were posed for a military victory. Only a major U.S. commitment could prevent it. General William Westmoreland sent in American infantry units to engage the enemy and blunt their offensive until enough troops could arrive to effect a more positive military situation in the country. The initial response to the emergency was successful. As the U.S. attempted to take the war to the enemy, search and destroy missions became the means. U.S. forces prevented the communists from massing for a major assault, demolished supply caches and base camps, disrupted infiltration into the South, and thwarted attempts to seize harvests. Despite the escalating growth of American troops during the period, however, the U.S. remained essentially on the defensive throughout 1966. Much of the American commitment was devoted to providing security to protect the building of an American infrastructure to conduct larger warfare. And the enemy maintained the ability to control the pace and intensity of com bat. To a large extent, the communists decided when to engage the Americans and to what degree.

The multi-dimensional nature of the war, as both a large unit conflict and a counterinsurgency effort, demanded a complex strategy and the elusiveness of the enemy called traditional war-making doctrines into question. The helicopter literally changed the nature of ground warfare, but it had negative as well as positive impacts.

The conflict in 1965 and 1966 was Westmoreland's war. President Johnson allowed his commander full authority to develop strategy and battlefield tactics, albeit under strict geographical constraints and with limited American manpower. In the elusive quest for a means of determining success, attrition became the goal of military operations. Although a "strategy in disrepute" since World War I, Westmoreland argued that there was no alternative and that despite the horrible costs, it would prove successful. At least through 1966, Westmoreland and the rest of the command structure believed that they had a successful formula that needed only greater tempo and mass.

Whether Westmoreland was ultimately proved wrong or whether the events of 1968 substantiated his belief is beyond the scope of this particular volume. Carland does address the question of whether search and destroy or pacification should have taken primacy when adequate manpower did not exist to seriously attempt both. In the early period, the limited and inconsistent American efforts on the pacification front were not particularly successful. The issue and the problem would continue to grow throughout the war.

An extensive literature exists on the decision process to undertake the combat role in 1965. Among the best recent studies are the works of Brian VanDeMark, H.R. McMaster, and Frederick Logeval. But for the war on the ground during this crucial period, Stemming the Tide is an essential source. Well researched, clearly written, and supported with exceptional pictures and combat maps, this is an extremely valuable resource.