Solution

Infantry Magazine, Spring, 2002

Tactical Decision Game #1-01

Assumptions:

Hill is rocky and devoid of vegetation.

We will get both 105 & 81mm priorities of fire.

Must get a sizeable element west of the hilltop to close the range so I can get effects on the enemy and pass the remaining elements in the battalion/brigade.

FRAGO follows:

Enemy contact with 2 machineguns south of CP2. Enemy crew served weapon sighted west of CPI. Dug-in enemy, estimated at platoon strength, vicinity north of CP3. C Co receiving indirect at the rear of the battalion formation.

Company mission--no change.

My intent--Retain control of Hill 122, destroy the crew-served weapons, suppress OBJ CAT, and pass the battalion (-) along AXIS WHITE.

Mortars--Immediate suppression south of CP2, 2 crew-served weapons in the open.

1st Plt--Suppress enemy machineguns south of CP2 in order to prevent direct fires on 3rd platoon. 60mm priority of fire. 81mm priority of fire once 3rd in SBF 3.

2nd Plt--Move to the spur northeast of CP 2 and occupy SBF 2. Suppress enemy between CPs 3 and I in order to facilitate movement of 3rd platoon along AXIS DOG. 105 & 81mm priorities of fire. O/O, guide B Co along AXIS WHITE.

3rd Plt (ME)--O/O, move west past the crest of Hill 122 and establish SBF 3. Fix the enemy on OBJ CAT in order to pass the battalion (-) along AXIS WHITE. 105mm priorities of fire once in SBF 3.

Fires:

FA--Disrupt dug-in enemy on OBJ CAT so that they can't place effective direct fires on 3rd platoon.

Mortar (81mm)--Obscure 3rd platoon's movement to SBF 3 from the enemy on CAT.

Mortar (60mm)--Destroy crew-served weapons south of CP 2.

AT--From SBF 2, destroy crew-served weapons position/bunkers to facilitate 3rd platoon's movement to SBF 3.

XO--Move with 2nd.

1SG--Establish the company CCP vicinity 2nd platoon's current location.

Rationale:

In order to give 1st platoon time to seek better cover and start massing fires on the machineguns, it was necessary to place some immediate fires on the two crew-served weapons to the south with my own co mortars. I moved 2nd platoon into SBF 2 in order to set the conditions for my main effort's movement west. Accurate small arms fires on the enemy will be difficult, due to the distance, but the crew-served weapons can still fire effectively. Furthermore, I'll engage one or more bunkers with Javelin in order to allow my main effort to close the distance without being under fire from the dug-in enemy. The 2nd platoon would have the time to work the FA and BN mortars onto CAT, and any other crew-served positions to the north as well. This is necessary to set the conditions for 3rd platoon's move west along AXIS DOG.

I saw it decisive to get an element on the western side of the hilltop to place effective fires on CAT so that the battalion could still maneuver. Simply seizing the hill top on 122 is not enough to accomplish the purpose the battalion commander assigned me. I can foresee a need for Class V resupply and anticipate enemy indirect fires on my positions (especially 2nd) given how long it will take to pass the brigade, let alone the remainder of the battalion.

Although time is critical, I would call the battalion commander and recommend to him that once I get 3rd platoon set in SBF, I could pass the next company in line (assuming it was B Co) to destroy the enemy on CAT. The other concern I had was the two enemy machineguns to the south. I'm sure I could destroy the crews for them, but it is likely that they are supported by infantry. If I encountered more enemy to the south, I would not have had 3rd platoon move west of the crest of the hill, but to orient more to the south to pass the battalion. The other option I considered was pulling a squad from 2nd to form a company reserve, since the range from SBT 2 to OBJ CAT would reduce the effectiveness of small arms fire. My first planning priority would be reinforcing 1st in the south, and my second would be reinforcing 3rd in SBF 3.

Even with the presence of the enemy, I still saw myself as terrain oriented, given the commander's guidance. I tried to focus on the necessity of getting to vantage points where I could, as a minimum, suppress the enemy to permit the battalion to pass. Naturally, these orders would need to be amended after things started to develop. They were intended to get us through the initial contact and get arrayed to start massing the effects of our combat power to achieve our purpose.

(Based on an actual vignette from: Army Historical Series, Combat Actions in Korea, Russell A. Gugeler, CMH Publication 30-2, Chapter 2. http://www.armv.mil/cmh-pg/books/korea/30-2/30-2_2.htm)