Help your delta company help you

Infantry Magazine, Jan-Feb, 2004 by Daniel R. Miller

I can still remember sitting in Building 4 at Fort Benning with my Infantry Career Captains Course (ICCC) classmates when everyone from the light world said, "I don't want a delta company (anti-tank) when it comes time for command." We learned nothing about delta companies in the basic course and coming from the mechanized world, I had no idea what they were talking about. Four and half months into my command of a delta company with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)--as I was getting ready to cross the Iraqi border with my company--I was convinced that neither did they.

What I had assembled in front of me was 75 percent of my battalion's combat power, and it was my job to effectively employ them in combat. The next month would carry us to An Najef and southeast Baghdad. During this stretch, my men conducted countless combat patrols, performed multiple route recons, and assisted with clearing each of these areas of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and ammunition caches. Furthermore, they secured the 327-vehicle convoy that crossed the Iraqi border, in addition to securing the assistant division commander for support and the division rear as they led the 101st Airborne Division from An Najef to Iskandaria Airfield. My Soldiers also secured the battalion tactical command post (TAC) as they circulated about the battlefield.

Our next move was to Mosul. Our mission transitioned to stability and support operations; however, the number of missions we conducted here grew at an astronomical rate. My company area of operations (AO) was approximately 700 square kilometers with more than 100,000 people. This AO required constant patrolling to get accurate assessments of what the towns needed and to establish contracts to fix the basic services in the towns. The critical service upon arriving in Mosul was fuel--both gasoline and propane. The U.S. paid for companies to provide fuel as the Iraqi pipelines underwent repair, and my gun trucks were responsible for escorting everything into the battalion's quarter of the city.

Additionally, there were a number of static sites that we were required to secure--the division headquarters, the civil-military operations center (CMOC), numerous pay sites, gas stations and propane distribution sites. Early in July, we added rest and recuperation (R&R) escort to our repertoire, which required a section to secure the buses from Mosul to the Army's R&R site for a three-day period. We also assisted with VIP security including during Ambassador L. Paul Bremer's visit. Civil-military and security operations consumed our days, and with each attack on U.S. forces or intelligence report of a possible attack, we stepped up our offensive operations at night.

On a nightly basis, I generally had:

[] Two platoons conducting traffic control points with the intent of interdicting weapons smuggling into the city;

[] One platoon pulling force protection at our company compound; one platoon acting as the battalion quick reaction force (QRF); and

[] One platoon serving in direct support of one of the line companies.

On several occasions, Delta Company contributed as the battalion's inner and outer ring cordon during task force-level cordon and knock/search operations. We also conducted smaller scale cordons in support of Task Force 20, as they serviced a number of high payoff targets.

The idea I am attempting to get across is that this company that my peers said they wouldn't want to command played an integral role in everything that this battalion did. While the line companies were able to establish a set operational cycle, there was an anti-tank (AT) section moving somewhere in Mosul 21 hours out of every day. Our mobility and firepower made us the most sought after asset in the battalion, and to think 1 was told that I did not want this job.

With all that being said, there are a couple of issues I would like to address that could help make this outfit even more lethal and survivable.

MAINTENANCE

As we hit the middle of July, I began to see more and more deadlined trucks, and I could not help but think of what could be done to prevent this from happening. Every truck in my company had logged, on average, 5,000-6,000 miles in the last four months. The wear and tear on these vehicles, which were also in Iraq 12 years ago during Operation Desert Storm, had taken its toll and was making our ability to maintain combat power difficult but not impossible.

Coming from a mechanized assignment, I was amazed to see the size of the battalion maintenance team that is expected to keep vehicles running in an air assault infantry battalion. Our battalion team is roughly the same size as a mechanized company maintenance team.

I have been blessed with having one of the best maintenance technicians in the Army, Warrant Officer Charles Schneider, and some great mechanics. The four-man contact team kept my company rolling throughout this deployment, but it came with a price of working these great Americans 24 hours a day. These conditions require a special breed of Soldier, especially m an environment where a broken down vehicle can make you a target of opportunity for the enemy in minutes. I lad we been the only element that the contact team was concerned with, their task would not have been so daunting. Unfortunately, when the Soldiers were done with our trucks, they simply moved on to the next company taking care of the entire battalion. This leads to my first suggestion add four mechanics to the MTOE of an air assault infantry battalion.