Lessons learned from a light infantry company during Operation Anaconda

Infantry Magazine, Summer, 2002 by Nelson G. Kraft

On 26 February 2002, I received an operations order from the Task Force 1-87 (TF Rakkasan) staff to conduct combat operations in the Sahi-Kot Valley of southeastern Afghanistan. This article is written to benefit the company grade commissioned and noncommissioned officers who may be called upon to lead their soldiers in combat in our country's war on terrorism. Although many after-action reports have surfaced since we entered this war, most have focused at echelons well above the company level. Infantry squads and platoons also fight and win battles, and this article is for them.

As the task force main effort, my company was to establish platoon-blocking positions (BPs) Heather and Ginger, south of the village of Marzak, along likely enemy exfiltration routes Chrysler and Jeep.

The big picture of this operation was for the Rakkasans--3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)--to establish blocking positions along the eastern and southern ridges of the Sahi-Kot Valley to block escaping Al Qaeda and Taliban forces, while Anti-Taliban Forces (ATFs) and Special Operations Forces moved from Gardez and cleared the Sahi-Kot Valley, which contained the villages of Serkhankhel, Babulkhel, and Marzak.

The weather was supposed to be good for the air assault, and the enemy had the advantage of terrain. The enemy situation was described as minimal. As we set up our blocking positions, along with the rest of the task force, it was anticipated that Afghani civilians and mixed Al Qaeda and Taliban forces would try to evacuate the Sahi-Kot Valley through our blocking positions.

The company mission was as follows:

H-Hour, D-Day, C/1-87 IN air assaults into AO Cobra to block Al Qaeda withdrawal along exfiltration routes Chrysler and Jeep in order to facilitate their destruction of.... Anti-Taliban Forces. The key tasks of my intent were to conduct a successful air assault, quickly establish the blocking position, block the enemy exfiltration routes, protect the force, and destroy the enemy.

My desired end state was to block exfiltration routes Chrysler and Jeep, Al Qaeda vicinity Objective Remington destroyed and C/1-87 IN positioned for follow-on operations. My decisive point was the destruction of Al Qaeda on route Chrysler. I chose this decisive point because I believed it was the most trafficable route out of the Sahi-Kot Valley.

My plan to mass overwhelming combat power at the decisive point was to place the effects of my most combat-experienced platoon at that location. 1st Platoon had priority of everything and was tasked to destroy Al Qaeda forces on route Chrysler with the purpose of facilitating the Al Qaeda's destruction by Anti-Taliban forces.

2nd Platoon, supporting effort #1, was tasked with blocking Al Qaeda forces on route Jeep to allow their destruction on route Chrysler by the company main effort.

3rd Platoon, supporting effort #2, was tasked to block enemy forces to prevent the envelopment of the company main effort from the south. The purpose of fires was to disrupt enemy movement along route Chrysler.

After numerous rehearsals at both task force and company levels, the company felt well prepared for this mission. On 012300Z Match 2002, Lift 1, consisting of 1st and 2nd Platoons and the company headquarters, were in PSS posture.

At 020048Z March 2002, Lift 1 departed FOB Bagram enroute to LZ 13A and 13. Approximately an hour later, we landed, exited the aircraft, and started movement to establish blocking positions (BPs) Heather and Ginger. Almost immediately after the CH-47s departed, we came under enemy direct fire from a ridgeline to the east. The company command post (CP) and the battalion tactical command post (BN TAC) were accompanying 1st Platoon, the company main effort. 1st Platoon continued movement to establish Heather, and the command and control elements from both battalion and the company followed.

After a minute or two, the enemy's fire increased, and they engaged with rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). 1st Platoon took immediate action by suppressing the enemy, while the rest of Lift I took cover. We quickly moved out and established the CP in a draw approximately 75 meters away from the BN TAC.

While 1st Platoon continued to bound back and suppress, 2d Platoon established communications from LZ 13. They too were under heavy enemy direct and RPG fire. Also at 2nd Platoon's location was the battalion mortar platoon. I ordered 2nd Platoon to return fire, seek cover, and look for a route to establish blocking position Ginger. Meanwhile, 1st Platoon established Heather and began receiving direct fire from a ridgeline in the west. I reported to the BN TAC that Heather was established and that unless the enemy was destroyed in the east, it would be difficult to set up Ginger. The platoon forward observers from 1st and 2nd Platoon were calling for both indirect fires and CAS as their respective platoons moved into position.

We began to receive heavy enemy mortar fire at both locations. The enemy accurately adjusted the indirect fire and one round impacted directly on BP Heather, injuring the platoon leader, platoon sergeant, forward observer, and radiotelephone operator. The remainder of 1st Platoon was able to collect casualties and start movement to the company casualty collection point (CCP). While 1st Platoon moved to the CCP, another round impacted, resulting in more casualties.