Anzio: the Gamble that Failed

Infantry Magazine, Summer, 2002 by Dominic J. Caraccilo

By Martin Blumenson

Cooper Square Press, 2001 (Second Edition). 212 Pages, Maps. $17.95, Softbound.

Thirty-eight years after its initial publication in 1963, Anzio: The Gamble That Failed by esteemed historian Martin Blumenson, once again hits the presses. By the end of 1943, the Allied campaign in Italy had become a stalemate as German forces stopped the Allied advance cold at Cassino.

In a country where the fighting front was limited by the 80-mile width of the Italian peninsula--and in a region where rugged mountains impeded maneuver and favored the defense---prospects for a swift and decisive victory were slim. What seemed to be a methodical beach assault and a push north to relieve the Cassino line and eventually to seize Rome and beyond became a five-month casualty-generating struggle.

This timeless account of the VI U.S. Army Corps beach landing and lodgment expansion of Anzio is a classic rendition of the ill-fated Allied attempt to "conduct linkup" and push north in an effort to draw Axis forces away from the Eastern Front.

The divergent interests of Great Britain and the United States, and their continuing lack of consensus on the question of how to conduct the war in Europe prompted the decision to strike at Anzio. The controversial Major General John Lucas led the assault that resulted in a four-month battle that some consider one of the most ill-conceived operations of the war, and by others as one of the notorious lost opportunities of the Allied war effort.

Blumenson describes in detail the events of the battle as it unfolds and, more importantly, he gives a first-rate account of the personalities and attitudes of the players involved. Most notably is his in-depth analysis of the interaction between the British and Theater Commander, Sir Harold Alexander, and the American leadership under the guise of Generals Mark Clark, John Lucas, and Lucian Truscott.

Blumenson rightly identifies the complex issues associated with the uncertainties and contributing factors that affected the outcome of the battle. He captures in remarkable form the essence behind the failed gamble as he meticulously analyzes the major figures involved. The Allied leaders in Italy at the time were "bedeviled by cross purposes and misunderstandings." Blumenson presents their characters here so clearly that what was at the time a most confusing situation emerges with embarrassing lucidity.

This is not just another chronological depiction of a failed World War II battle. It is a classic model of leadership and the angst that leaders experience when the decision-making is at its hardest. Anco: The Gamble that Failed is full of lessons learned, from the strategic level down to the tactical. It should be required reading for military leaders at all levels.