Glider assault on Eben Emael as an archetype for the future

Infantry Magazine, March-April, 2004 by Paul Witkowski

Within 20 minutes of landing, all of the critical offensive weapons of Fort Eben Emael were rendered inoperable; however, this did not mean that there was no longer a threat from the fort or from outside Belgian reinforcements. The Belgian commander, Major Jean Fritz Lucien Jottrand, called for other Belgian units to fire artillery on his fort to kill the German glidermen, which caused havoc on the fort's surface. The incoming fire caused the glidermen to seek cover in the knocked out casemates. The results of the long, hard training paid off as Sergeant Wenzel automatically assumed command in Lieutenant Witzig's absence. He directed other squads to attack remaining targets, organized a hasty defense, and reported the mission's status to Hauptmann Koch. He also directed airstrikes from Stuka dive bombers against reinforcing Belgian units. With extraordinary determination, Lieutenant Witzig was able to commandeer another tow aircraft to recover his glider outside of Cologne after his tow rope broke enroute to the fort; at around 0630 hours Witzig's glider finally landed inside Eben Emael.

The plan called for 'Granite' to destroy the fort's offensive batteries and hold the fort for four hours until relieved by the troops of 4th Armored Infantry Division. Dutch and Belgian resistance delayed the battle handover until May 11 at 0830 hours though--24 hours later than planned. During this prolonged stay on the fort, the glidermen parried multiple counterattacks and managed to keep the Belgian artillerymen contained within the subterranean confines of the fort, as well as keep reinforcing Belgian units at bay from the tort by using air strikes. A total of 78 German glidermen landed on the fort and forced the capitulation of the Belgian garrison of 780 men in the world's strongest fort at a cost of four Germans killed and 12 wounded. Two elements provided the key to success: the combat glider and the hollow charge. Without either of these elements the seizure of Eben Emael would have cost much more in human lives and altered the attack routes and time schedule of Plan Gelb.

Perhaps the success at Fort Eben Emael set a false precedent for the Germans. A year later, the Germans took another huge gamble of sending a large-scale airborne invasion of the island of Crete. "Although 15,000 German airborne troops defeated a force almost three times their number, the Germans lost 5,000 killed and wounded and a large number of aircraft," Mzarek said. This bittersweet victory caused a drastic curtailment of glider and parachute operations. Granted, some glider operations continued such as the rescue of Benito Mussolini at Gran Sasso and emergency resupply operations in Russia, North Africa, and Eastern Europe towards the end of the war, but the Germans never attempted another large-scale glider and parachute attack.

U.S. Glider Development

The highly successful German operation did not go unnoticed by the Western Allies; both Great Britain and the United States did not have a military glider program when Sturmabteilung Koch attacked Eben Emael in 1940. Nonetheless, the Allies learned much from the German assault. One of these lessons was the success of vertical envelopment. Instead of the traditional method of searching for an assailable flank by ground maneuver, aircraft and gliders were used to deliver men, weapons, and equipment from above, opening a new dimension to ground commanders. Second, gliders surprised, shocked, and stunned defenders which gave the glidermen a temporary advantage to overwhelm defenders.