Thinking beyond the first mile: a look at interpreters on combat logistics patrols

Infantry Magazine, March-June, 2009 by David E. Leiva, J. Saad

In his 2003 book Applied Economics, renowned Stanford University economist Thomas Sowell concludes that politicians habitually fail to look beyond the immediate effects of their economic policies to the long-term repercussions.

"Most thinking stops at stage one," Sowell writes. "Many of the 'unintended consequences' of policies and programs would have been foreseeable from the outset if the process had been analyzed in terms of the desirability of the goals they proclaim."

This essay is not about economics or politics. It is about an asset that is slowly trickling into Army units in theater--translator aides--known simply by their military occupational specialty, 09L. This article is also about the apparent disconnect that exists between the strategic level and the operational level--the most critical piece of the puzzle--where this asset is employed.

More succinctly, here's one example of how we used our linguist outside of full-spectrum operations, outside any real guidelines, and how necessary it was to think beyond stage one in order to do so.

When SGT J. Saad (name abbreviated for operational security concerns) walked into the motor pool of Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion, 116th Infantry at Al Asad Air Base, Iraq, in 2007, it seemed like a prayer had been answered.

Tasked with providing convoy security throughout Al Anbar Province, a 30,000-square-mile-area west of Ramadi that borders Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, our National Guard light infantry unit would have the same unfettered access to the arsenal of our active duty counterparts.

The impact was immediate. Saad, a National Guard Soldier, quickly put together a cultural briefing, specifically tailored to Multi National Force--West, that had a sense of freshness and authenticity unmatched in previous presentations. It's important to note that not only was he fluent in Arabic, but he held a doctorate in American government and public policy and was a former college professor. As expected, his presentation skills were impressive.

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Unfortunately, unlike other Army weapons, SGT Saad did not come with an instruction manual on how to be used during combat logistics patrols (CLPs). If the unit were tasked with developing relationships with local sheiks, imams or politicians, his role would be obvious. The question left--what now?

Even in 2002, forward-thinking officers, such as MAJ Paul Schmitt, were posing the same question without satisfactory answers.

"Small unit commanders and leaders in an engagement area are often the ones most in need of interpreters, but also often the ones who have the least idea of how to use them properly," Schmitt wrote for Infantry Magazine while assigned to the Department of Foreign Languages at the U.S. Military Academy.

Clearly, it was time to think beyond stage one. With few exceptions, the evidence provided is anecdotal. A forensic look at this article might reveal fatal flaws in the logic and conclusion. If nothing else, though, perhaps this field research will offer another view. That said, here's what we learned.

Interpreters: The Public Face

Convoy security, once the sole realm of military police, has quickly fallen into the hands of infantry units, albeit, active or National Guard. One only needed to look at Al Anbar Province to find such examples. Bravo Company replaced a mechanized infantry company of the 1st Infantry Division. Also, a battalion of the 82nd Airborne Division conducted convoy movements from Jordan. Both are proof, at least for the time being, that this mission isn't strictly for the combat support units or the National Guard.

The pragmatic approach would be to place Saad in every convoy, essentially making him the busiest Soldier in the company. But with different squads leaving at all times of the day throughout the week, picking the best mission would have been a matter of opinion, not science. Among the questions:

* Should he go on long missions through some of Iraq's named areas of interest or Tier ! hot spots?

* Would it be better for him to go into locations where there was a likelihood of stops in urban areas or where interaction with Iraqi police and Army was most probable?

* Do we base it on the most recent intelligence?

* What exactly should be the criteria?

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We didn't have a good answer. One thing was for sure, though: If we had seven linguists or translators, it would be a no-brainer to attach one to each squad.

"Interpreters are the public face of the counterinsurgency effort to the local population; on their words hinges success or failure," wrote LTC John Nagl in the foreword to Instructions for American Servicemen in Iraq during Worm War H. "It is far easier to defeat an insurgency with words than with machine guns."

Nagl, then commander of the 1st Battalion, 34th Armor at Fort Riley, Kan., understands firsthand the importance of this commodity. Among the leading visionaries to help "move the Army out of its comfort zone," he authored several books before recently retiring, including Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam and contributed to the Army's recently released Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24.