"Streetfighting": The Rifle Platoon in MOUT

Infantry Magazine, Sept-Dec, 2000 by Captain John W. Karagosian

Stated another way, up to 75 percent our casualties are hit when they are not clearing or moving inside buildings. To reduce casualties and increase the chances for mission success, we must do the following:

* Avoid areas where casualties are most likely.

* Spend as little time as possible in areas we can't avoid.

* Implement TTPs to better protect the soldiers who are moving through these high-risk areas.

Our vision of the battlefield is part of the problem. Consider Battle Drill Six, Enter and Clear a Building (ARTEP 7-8 Drill). The condition for this task states, "The platoon is moving when it receives fire from the enemy in a building." In this example, all elements that are not assaulting are in support-by-fire (SBF) positions, oriented on the objective building (Figure 1). This technique will work if the enemy is in a single, isolated building and does not have mutual support from somewhere else. Any nearby enemy we have not considered could be a real threat to our assault.

Yet in the following example, we see the problem taken a step further. In Figure 2 (taken from FM 90-10-1), we see a company attacking an enemy strongpoint, labeled Building 26. Except for one squad in Building 12, all supporting fires (two rifle platoons, a rifle squad, and two tanks) are oriented solely on the objective building from corners D to A to B.

How is this a problem? In the close confines of the MOUT battlefield, an avenue of approach leading to the objective building can almost always be observed from several adjacent structures, which can also be enemy occupied. By focusing fires and observation on the objective building only, we invite destruction from surprise fire delivered by an alert enemy providing mutual support from nearby. We are then slow to react to this new threat, resulting in multiple casualties in the assault teams as they try to create a foothold. Taken to an extreme, it is not uncommon at the JRTC to see a fire team or squad destroyed while assaulting an empty building.

In Figure 3, we see two platoons clearing a street. The enemy is defending three buildings with a reinforced squad. The squad positions offer mutual support, and their sectors of fire include short range, frontal fire between buildings (dashed lines), and flanking and oblique fire from the sides of buildings (thick lines). Note that the defenders on the east side of Building 11 and the west side of Building 23 are masked from the fire of the friendly platoon that "owns" that building. The enemy crossfire refuses to respect our platoon boundaries. As can be seen, a "by the book" technique will probably result in heavy casualties in the open areas west of Buildings 11 and 22.

The purpose of direct and indirect fires is to allow our assault teams and squads to secure a foothold on the objective building. Suppressing the building itself helps this effort. The adjacent enemy buildings may also have to be suppressed. At the close engagement ranges so common to MOUT, unseen and unengaged enemy can unhinge our plan.