Boyd: the Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War

Infantry Magazine, May-June, 2004

Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War. By Robert Coram. Little, Brown and Company, New York, 2002. 485 pages. $27.95. Reviewed by Major Dennis P. Chapman.

Robert Coram has brought us a vivid description of a remarkable man who, though operating largely unknown to the public, made a tremendous contribution to the national security of the United States during a period of service spanning most of the Cold War. That man was U.S. Air Force Colonel John Boyd, and an extraordinary man he was. Possessed of astonishing imagination and creative power, Boyd was the driving force behind at least four different far-ranging intellectual efforts, each of which had a direct and profound impact on the way America fights. He developed the first comprehensive doctrinal manual for air-to-air combat in U.S. Air Force history; he developed a revolutionary concept--the Energy-Maneuverability (E-M) Theory. This theory, which was for designing and evaluating combat aircraft, was based upon how fast an aircraft can gain or lose energy in order to achieve a position of advantage against another pilot. He was also the driving force behind development of the F16 fighter, working relentlessly to ensure that the aircraft would enter production as the trim, agile killing machine he envisioned and not as a ponderous flying brick encumbered by excessive, ineffective technological gadgetry. Boyd's greatest achievement and his most far-reaching contribution, however, wasn't in the air; it was in his development of a time-based theory of war focused on ground combat. The heart of this effort was his four-step "Observe-Orient-Decide-Act" decision-making model--the now-famous "OODA Loop." In essence, Boyd argued that to be successful in combat, a commander must "get inside" his adversary's decision loop. This involves not only making decisions faster than the enemy, but also disrupting the enemy's decision loop, forcing him to make decisions based upon outdated, inaccurate, or irrelevant information so that he becomes disoriented, demoralized, and ultimately unable to act.

The chief weakness of the book is Coram's lack of objectivity about Boyd's significant personal flaws and about his relationship with the Air Force. Boyd was a volatile and mercurial man who could be petulant, self-absorbed, and arrogant. He could be abrasive even--abusive--and had a flair for humiliating those he deemed his enemies. Coram trots out examples of the foibles of the general officers Boyd so disdained as evidence of their venality and incompetence, but he easily forgives equally egregious behavior by Boyd himself, as if to imply that in Boyd's case such faults were indicative of his passion, integrity, and depth of commitment and therefore acceptable. Finally, Coram depicts the Air Force as hell-bent on stifling Boyd and suppressing his ideas. The reality, however, seems more ambiguous. Only a small percentage of officers ever reach the rank of full colonel, and only a few of those receive commands. Yet Boyd achieved both, possibly due to the quiet support and glowing endorsements on his officer evaluation reports (OERs) by several general officers during his career. Furthermore, as controversial as he was, Boyd was able to bring much of his work to fruition while still on active duty, often using Air Force resources. So, while the Air Force bitterly opposed Boyd at many junctures on the one hand, it also advanced, nurtured, and protected him on the other, facilitating his work and enabling him to realize his great potential.

All in all, I highly recommend this book. A lively and pleasant read, it is also quite informative and presents the essence of Boyd's ideas in a straightforward, easily understood manner, making the book a rewarding effort well worth the modest investment of time and money that it requires.