The Navy's Air War in Korea: September-October 1950

0 Comments | Naval Aviation News, Sept, 2000 | by Mark L. Evans

Ensign Eldon W. Brown, Jr., of Fighter Squadron (VF) 53 had a feeling that this run was going to be the toughest of the lot. Diving through North Korean flak to strafe a row of wooden crates, his guns suddenly set off a tremendous explosion. Barely keeping his plane in the air through the resulting shock wave, Brown climbed quickly, but still could not outrun the ensuing cloud which passed him at 4,000 feet. Miles away in Inchon harbor, the transport Mount McKinley (AGC 7) rocked at her moorings and the crew radioed strike leader Commander Joseph M. Murphy, "What the hell happened?" Murphy casually responded, "We just exploded some ammunition." The Battle of Inchon had begun.

When the North Korean invasion ran Out of steam near the Naktong River around Pusan during August and September 1950 (see "Korea's Early Days: Carrier Air Power's Proving Ground," Jul-Aug 00), the situation presented General Douglas MacArthur a golden opportunity. MacArthur quickly assessed that the North Korean People's Anny's (NKPA) weakness in strategic mobility comprised its Achilles' heel, and he decided that a landing against its exposed flank would threaten the enemy's overextended forces at the most vulnerable point, and regain the initiative for the beleaguered United Nations (UN) forces.

On 10 August 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved Inchon as the target, and six days later the X Corps, Major General Edward M. Almond commanding, was activated to carry out the hazardous undertaking, designated Operation Chromite.

Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, Commander Amphibious Group 1, was assigned the crucial task of getting Almond's men ashore and keeping them there, while the perilous first wave was assigned to Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Smith's 1st Marine Division. Once the Marines secured the beachhead, the Army's 7th Bayonet Division, led by Maj. Gen. David G. Barr, would follow up. A successful landing at Inchon would make it possible to cut the enemy's primary supply lines through Seoul and secure the nearby airfields at Kimpo and Suwon.

As if the NKPA didn't present enough of a challenge, the site was also plagued by a treacherous tidal range, one of the most extreme in Korea. Landing craft could cross the wide mud flats only at flood tide, and if enemy fire could not be suppressed it would be a blood bath. The narrow islands and channels of the approaches were also a navigational nightmare. To offset these problems and to prevent the North Koreans from strengthening their defenses, Kunsan, 105 miles south of Inchon, was chosen as a decoy to convince the North Koreans that the landings would occur there and not at Inchon.

In the days preceding the landings, UN air power pounded Kunsan. Strikes by both U.S. aircraft from Badoeng Strait (CVE 116) and British aircraft from the carrier HMS Triumph alternated with missions by USAF aircraft ranging from North American P-51 Mustangs to Boeing B-29 Superfortresses. Despite some alarming intelligence indications, including the revelation that a spy possessed copies of some of the plans, the deception worked and the North Koreans were taken completely by surprise.

Throughout Operation Chromite, the Navy maintained its carrier air groups (CVG) aboard large carriers (CV), while the Marines flew all of the fixed wing aircraft aboard the lighter carriers (CVE/CVL), with the exception of some Air Antisubmarine Squadron 22 TBM-3E/S Avengers aboard Sicily (CVE 118). Helicopter detachments aboard all carriers remained Navy manned at this time, though Marine Observation Squadron (VMO) 6 was deployed ashore.

During the UN's air campaign in the Yellow Sea, Badoeng Strait, Boxer (CV 21) with CVG-2 embarked, Philippine Sea (CV 47) with CVG-11, Valley Forge (CV 45) with CVG-5, Sicily and HMS Triumph plastered North Korean positions with pinpoint precision. Alarms were a daily occurrence, but only once were the carriers themselves seriously threatened.

On 4 September Valley Forge's combat air patrol (CAP), comprising four F4U-4B Corsairs from VF-53, was stationed 20 miles from the carrier at 10,000 feet under the control of Fletcher (DDE 445). At 1329 radar detected "bogeys" closing from 60 miles away, not showing identification friend or foe. A minute later the CAP was ordered to intercept just as the raid split, with one part retiring north toward Kaiyo To Island, the other part closing on the task force at a ground speed of 180 knots at 12-13,000 feet.

At 1336 the Corsairs intercepted the raid 30 miles from the task force and discovered a bomber marked with Soviet red stars. Just as the CAP was requesting permission to fire if fired upon, the bomber's rear gunner fired on them, whereupon permission was given to open up. Division leader Lieutenant (jg) Richard Elwood Downs was out of position and missed on his first run, but his wingman, Ens. Edward Velora Laney, Jr., riddled the enemy aircraft with his guns, hitting the engine and exploding the fuel tank, as well as shooting off the tail section.

Later identified as an Ilyushin IL-l0, the intruder spun into the sea in flames. There were no other contacts and the Corsairs recovered aboard by 1600. One of the bodies retrieved from the wreckage was Russian, and it was surmised that the aircraft had been delivered to a Manchurian field for North Korea. The bomber's actions during the confrontation substantiated claims concerning the depth of East Bloc involvement in the Korean War.