Doctrine and combat support C2

Air Force Journal of Logistics,  Summer, 2003  by John Richards

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The combat support command and control (CSC2) operational architecture report (1) highlights the importance of doctrine in establishing an effective command and control (C2) structure. Sound guidance on command and control is especially important in the area of combat support (CS) because responsibilities typically cross between combatant command and service chains of command and usually extend beyond the borders of the combatant commander's theater. Our existing CS doctrine is extremely thin, especially in the area of command and control, and needs a complete overhaul.

Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines doctrine as "fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives." Doctrine allows us to provide our warfighters with knowledge on how best to employ air and space forces by providing them with distilled insights and wisdom gained from experience in warfare and other military operations. (2) Doctrine is similar to policy in that it provides guidance to the warfighter on how to accomplish the mission, but unlike policy, doctrine does not mandate compliance with a specific process or practice. Doctrine allows the warfighter the flexibility to deviate as circumstances dictate. While policy is often written to ensure compliance with law, international agreement, or convention; specify standardization for efficiency or effectiveness; or ensure safety, doctrine is written to guide our warfighters' actions so they do not have to relearn lessons with each successive operation.

In the CS arena, a review of lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm to Operation Enduring Freedom indicates that, in many areas, we have failed to learn from past experience. In part, that is due to a lack of adequate CS doctrine. We have not done an effective job of translating lessons learned into doctrine, which leads us to repeat our mistakes or fail to pass on our successes from one operation to the next. To improve CS doctrine, we must institutionalize a process that allows us to capture lessons learned; test potential solutions to identified problems and successful innovations through wargames, experiments, exercises, or field tests; and then translate concepts that can be implemented into doctrine. This is especially true in the area of CSC2.

CSC2 is one of the least documented, least understood, yet most critical areas of combat support. The requirement for services to provide organized, trained, and equipped forces to the combatant commanders and (3) sustain those forces extends into the theater in both peacetime and war. (4) With the move to reduce the forward footprint and transition to a distribution-based vice inventory-based sustainment system, deployed forces are much more reliant on reachback to support outside the theater than ever before. Clearly defined C2 roles and responsibilities for combat support have become absolutely critical to the combatant commander's effective execution of the mission. Yet, as the CSC2 operational architecture report shows, Air Force doctrine on CSC2 is almost nonexistent.

At the fall 2001 Air Force Installations and Logistics/Major Command (MAJCOM) Directors of Logistics Conference, our senior logistics leaders reviewed Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-4, Combat Support, and decided that a major overhaul was overdue. With the publication of AFDD 2-4 three years before, Air Force CS processes had undergone significant transformation that needed to be incorporated into doctrine. The original publication included little in the way of useful guidance for engaged forces and contained almost nothing about the tasks, capabilities, and effects of combat support. In coordination with the Air Force Doctrine Center, Air Force Installations and Logistics and MAJCOMs initiated a major revision of AFDD 2-4 in January 2002. Subsequently, all subordinate doctrine documents (5) to AFDD 2-4 have been opened for revision by the Air Force Doctrine Center, while a new document, AFDD 2-4.5, Legal Support, has just been published. However, with the execution of Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom and development of the Chief of Staff's six operational concepts of operation, (6) the knowledge gap has grown even wider.

While we have made a good start on identifying problems with current CS doctrine and have made some inroads into rewriting existing documents in the 2-4 series, much work remains to be done. We need to capture and incorporate the lessons learned from recent operations. We need to capture and incorporate transformational concepts now being implemented. And we need to expand and improve CS information in critical documents outside the AFDD 2-4 series such as AFDD 2, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power, and AFDD 2-8, Command and Control.

Notes

(1.) James A. Leftwich; Amanda Geller; David Johansen; Tom LaTourrette; Patrick Mills; C. Robert Roll, Jr; Robert Tripp; and Cauley von Hoffman, Supporting Expeditionary Aerospace Forces: An Operational Architecture for Combat Support Execution Planning and Control, RAND, MR-1536-AF, 2002