Expeditionary Operations: intermediate engine maintenance alternatives

Air Force Journal of Logistics, Spring, 2001 by Mahyar A. Amouzegar, Lionel Galway, Amanda Geller, Robert S. Tripp, Clifford Grammich

Conflict Intensity

The basic scenario assumes that surge operations will last 10 days. MTWs with longer surges will miss sorties if other operation parameters remain unchanged. For example, for the F100-229 engine being repaired by the decentralized-deployed alternative resourced for the scenario, a 20-day surge will lead to a missed sortie rate of about 10 percent, while a 40-day surge will lead to a missed sortie rate of about 20 percent. The model indicates the FSL alternative would better adapt to longer surge operations with fewer sorties missed.

Conclusions and Recommendations

This study evaluated several maintenance policies for F100 220, F100-229 and TF-34 fighter engines. For an MTW, deploying the JEIM to an FOL is too slow. For each engine, the deployed JEIM had the worst performance during the first part of the war because of the time it takes to establish a JEIM shop, particularly the test cell. Constructing test cells at potential FOLs could reduce this time but would reduce flexibility for expeditionary operations since it is not feasible to carry out this program for all possible FOLs. A deployed JEIM also requires transportation resources that may be needed for other parts of the deployment, especially in the early stages of a conflict.

FSLs for wartime support of fighter engines, with removal rates in the range experienced by the F100 engines, seemed to offer the most attractive policy in terms of serviceable engine availability and its effect on fighter capability. The speed with which FSL repair can begin wartime operations and its short transportation pipeline are well suited for expeditionary missions. An FSL JEIM also requires fewer personnel in the critical early days of combat and performs better in the face of uncertainties.

However, consolidating repair operations for F100 engines will require a dedicated, responsive, and substantial intratheater transportation system during an MTW, particularly during surge operations. Transportation delays will lead to loss of capability. The development of any consolidated maintenance structure will require considerable planning from a global, strategic perspective.

The low removal rates for the TF-34 make centralization of its maintenance operations easier. Continued centralization of TF-34 repair appears to be the best policy, supported by both analysis and experience at Shaw AFB, even to the extent of using CSLs to support MTWs. However, as a hedge against transportation uncertainties, some TF-34 repair capability might be included in an FSL.

Finally, there are a number of qualitative considerations to bear in mind when considering centralized engine repair.

* Past centralization attempts have had a mixed record on responsiveness to units. Other questions of organizational control are also contentious. Such issues must be settled early and clearly for any centralization effort to succeed.

* JEIM consolidation will require attention to flight-line experience so that flight-line diagnosis is not compromised. If the flight line requires relatively more experienced personnel when not collocated with JEIM, this will offset some of the resource economies of scale suggested by the analysis. Alternatively, since the JEIM currently backs up the flight line, if flight-line experience is not maintained or increased, removal rates may increase.