Is agile logistics focused logistics in hiding? - Inside Logistics

Air Force Journal of Logistics, Summer, 2002 by Nancy Stinson

Should effects-based logistics be developed to replace agile logistics? Does the logistics career field need its own published doctrine?

Any military professional can make the statement, "Logistics is the key to successful operations in a war or wartime contingency," and most people would agree. However, ask those same people about logistics doctrine, and most of the time you will probably draw a blank stare, an I don't know shrug, or perhaps a smirk of indifference. I do not think you can blame anyone for giving one of those responses; after all, what is logistics doctrine anyway? Better yet, where is it published? If you look through today's published doctrine, it would be hard to find a definition of logistics in concert with current doctrine. Where does doctrine define logistics core competencies in a manner that would agree with Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1, Air Warfare, which defines effects as "the operational or strategic-level outcomes that Air Force functions are intended to produce"? Why not take that statement and add logistics to it and define effects "as the operational, strategic, and logistics outcome that Air Force functio ns are intended to produce"? Could the introduction of an effects-based logistics concept improve the Air Force expeditionary combat support concept? This approach could build upon the Department of Defense concept of Full Spectrum Dominance and Focused Logistics. How can effects-based logistics be defined? How about the "desired logistics effects in support of operational or strategic-level outcomes that the Air Force functions are intended to produce"?

The introduction of logistics in this definition would eliminate the casual approach to preplanning the materials required for the specified outcome intended for the operation. More attention would be directed toward the development of refined logistics procedures and technology that will aid in the battle. With the evolution of just-in-time supply and two-level maintenance, the precision with which logistics requirements can be satisfied has been increased dramatically. That means there is a requirement for a far more integrated relationship between logistics and operations. Because dramatic battlefield successes are achieved increasingly over very short periods of time, the phases of a campaign can be moved through much faster. This means that logistics requirements need to focus on anticipating battlefield results and quickly adapting logistics flows to what happens on the battlefield. Instead of being reactionary, logistics must be anticipatory--two steps ahead of the next set of requirements. This is ef fects-based logistics because, as the battlefield changes, logistics support not only changes but also, if done in an effects-based approach, can be used by the operators to leverage capabilities and shape the branch and sequel courses of action. The rapid response of today's operations will determine the size and amount of logistics support, subsequently requiring a higher speed and accuracy of logistics operations than have ever attained before. This requirement for rapid logistics support will continue to increase as the new century and a new space-focused mission unfold--one can only imagine filling MICAPS in a space environment? How can reach-back capability be defined then? It cannot be unless there is logistics doctrine to fall back on.

This argument is not fundamentally new. The real question is whether it is an evolutionary movement toward a more focused agile logistics support structure or an effects-based structure needed to meet the requirements of the modern battlefield? Current logistics reengineering efforts would support the latter. For example, the draft version of the Logistics Transformation Plan lists the traits necessary for a successful transformation as "time-definite delivery, time-definite resupply, theater reach back to CONUS logistics centers, and develop for use, an integrated state-of-the-art information system to source, acquire, and transport items directly to the warfighter." Major K. Noedskov wrote an article titled "Systematizing Effect-Based Air Operations" that outlined his proposal to systematize the operational-level, effects-driven planning process. Major Noedskov's outline is used to identify centers of gravity at the strategic and tactical level and assign decisive points and associated effects at each of t he three levels of war. However, his framework has been adjusted slightly to present a concept of effects-based logistics.

According to current Air Force doctrine, the tenets of agile logistics are defined as time-definite delivery, reach-back capability logistics command, control, and global combat support system. These four tenets will be identified as logistic centers of gravity. The desired end states will be deploy, sustain, and protect. The defining points will be the operational mission-capable rate and sustainment.

Using this proposed Four Box Model, the concepts listed above would constitute logistics centers of gravity. The cumulative effects of these four centers of gravity could impact the desired effects of an operation or a deployment. The three desired end states summarize the logistics mission during critical elements of an operation--the requirement to deploy, followed with the need to sustain operations while protecting assets. Each of these areas constitutes critical effects of the entire logistics system, which could impact the operation. Logistics functions should be considered as more than simply enablers to the Air Force mission. As Alexander the Great noted centuries ago, effects-based logistics is key to operational campaign success.