Innovative or insane? Civilian contract air refueling - Point of View

Air Force Journal of Logistics, Summer, 2002 by Robert D. Pollock

The article by Major Mark D. Camerer (Volume 26, Number 1) advocates actively pursuing civilian contract air refueling (CCAR) capability to aid in the defense of the nation. The article cites numerous sources and facts and then concludes that the way ahead is singular. Unfortunately, the article relies upon errors and omissions of fact in order to make its point.

In March 1998, The US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) thoroughly evaluated the CCAR concept and rejected it as providing no significant wartime requirement or cost benefit for the Services. In March 2000, USTRANSCOM forwarded its findings to the Director of the Joint Staff, who independently determined that the potential wartime benefit was not worth the costs. As recently as June 2002, the USTRANSCOM commander, in a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, stated, "The Navy can save precious dollars through use of AMC [Air Mobility Command] tankers" and "I hope that your staff might reexamine the value of continuing your Omega Air (CCAR) contract."

USTRANSCOM and the Joint Staff disagree with the CCAR concept because the facts don't support it. The article implies that the concept has been proven and that it is providing cost saving services to the Navy. This is not the case. The single CCAR aircraft is used to support test and local training operations for probe-equipped aircraft only. The author spends time making a case that CCAR operations are cost-effective, but the data provided obfuscate the truth. The author claims that the cost of flying hours on a CCAR tanker "fits squarely in the middle of organic air-refueling costs." This could be a point of comparison if the Navy reimbursed the Air Force for air-refueling flying-hour costs--but it doesn't--the Navy reimburses the Air Force for fuel offloaded, just like it does to the CCAR, but then, the Navy also has to pay the rest of the CCAR bill.

But what is the bill the taxpayers are paying? The article cites a CCAR cost per hour of $5,995. This number is a half-truth. The Navy is actually paying approximately $9,000 per hour for the CCAR service and has budgeted $10,000 per hour--all while Air Force tankers are essentially free to the Navy and Marine Corps as a product of the Air Force training program and operations and maintenance account. The Navy reimburses the Air Force for fuel offload only, while it must pay CCAR for the fuel offloaded, tanker aircraft fuel burn, and per diem, in addition to the $5,995 per flight hour. In effect, the taxpayers pay twice for every fill-up on the CCAR aircraft: a $9,000 per hour CCAR bill and the normal training flying hour bill for the Air Force tankers, which the Navy opted not to use.

In making the case for training benefits, the article states, "CCAR increases training opportunities." This is false. The Department of Defense (DoD) has long held that units should train, as they will fight. Refueling off CCAR aircraft is incomplete air-refueling training for the Navy since the CCAR aircraft is dissimilar from KC-135 and KC-l0. Additionally, use of the CCAR by Navy forces denies currency-training opportunities to Air Force crews. This loss of training actually decreases airpower employment effectiveness through loss of currency by aircrews in both Services.

Another claim made by the article is, "CCAR fills the gap in wartime plan deficiencies." The author omitted mention of a 1996 DoD report to Congress, which identified what combat missions could be civilianized and what could not. Based on months of study and Office of the Secretary of Defense review, the report states that air refueling was not a candidate for civilianization since it is an inherent combat capability critical for the Navy and Marine Corps and was particularly critical to the Air Force in order to execute the Global Strike and Global Mobility missions. Use of civilian aircraft in war scenarios raises significant unresolved legal and treaty issues far outweighing any benefit to be derived by the civilian tankers.

In July 2002, AMC reviewed the CCAR aircraft against the Joint Requirements Oversight Council-approved mission requirements for air refueling aircraft and found that the CCAR airframe meets none of the nine criteria established for air refueling aircraft. CCAR fails to meet the requirement for refueling the full range of receiver aircraft. It is not capable of carrying and offloading fuel other than primary fuel. It cannot maximize fuel offload rates within receiver onload capabilities. It cannot onload fuel as a receiver from other air-refueling aircraft. CCAR aircraft are neither capable of meeting alert requirements nor capable of operating amidst worldwide threats. They do not have a multimission capacity and are not able to serve as a robust, survivable, and secure communications link. In all, CCAR represents the antithesis of filling "the gap in wartime plan deficiencies." Planning for the "specialized" use of the CCAR would instead add to the "fog of war" during today's need for instantaneous response .