Improving bare base agile combat support: a comparative analysis between land basing and afloat prepositioning of bare-base support equipment

Air Force Journal of Logistics,  Summer, 2004  by Joseph E. Diana

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In a tale of war, the reader's mind is filled with the fighting. The battle--with its vivid scenes, its moving incidents, its plain and tremendous results--excites imagination and commands attention. The eye is fixed on the fighting brigades as they move amid the smoke, on the swarming figures of the enemy, on the general, serene and determined, mounted in the middle of his staff. The long trailing line of communications is unnoticed. The fierce glory that plays on red, triumphant bayonets dazzles the observer, nor does he care to look behind to where, along a thousand miles of rail, road, and river, the convoys are crawling to the front in uninterrupted succession. Victory is the beautiful, bright coloured flower. Transport is the stem without which it could never have blossomed.

--Winston Churchill

Article Highlights

Base-base operations and bare-base assets are key to making expeditionary airpower and agile combat support a reality. This article compares the recommendations of two separate agile combat support study efforts and offers an overall recommendation concerning the best choice based on responsiveness, readiness, supportability, and cost. The first study, conducted by RAND, focused on improving agile combat support by suggesting network of land-based sites--forward support locations. The second study, conducted by the Air Force Logistics Management Agency, takes a different tactic. It suggests adding a prepositioned sealift component for bare base assets similar to the one currently used for munitions. These two studies provide key strategies to improve the Air Force's ability to project expeditionary airpower rapidly anywhere in the world. The focus of this article is determining the best option for meeting the needs of the Air Force. It advocates that an afloat option has sufficient merit across the spectrum of readiness, responsiveness, supportability and cost to make it the better choice.

While RAND and the AFLMA offer differing views concerning bare-base assets, they have worked collectively under the sponsorship of the Air Staff on a variety of agile combat support efforts.

Introduction

Air Force guidance is rife with statements on the importance of its expeditionary capability. As an example, in the 2003 Air Force Posture Statement, the term expeditionary occurs 30 times. In spite of a 30-percent reduction in service manpower over the last 12 years, the Air Force has experienced an exponential increase in worldwide taskings. (1) Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, in a prepared statement before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, 3-4 October 2001, acknowledged the impact from the events of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent security environment. He stated, "A transformed force must be able to ... project and sustain forces in distant access-denial environments." Two Air Force distinctive capabilities-rapid global mobility and agile combat support (ACS)--focus efforts further on making the Air Force as expeditionary as possible. (2) The term expeditionary is not specifically defined in Air Force doctrine but is understood to describe a capability to deploy rapidly anywhere in the world, quickly establish operations, and sustain those operations for as long as necessary. RAND's analysis of Air Force efforts in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom highlighted the challenges associated with rapidly deploying forces and initiating combat operations. This critique of the Air Force is not new. The Air Force has struggled with expeditionary operations since becoming a separate service. In the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, the Air Force's inability to deploy quickly and operate with a focused footprint resulted in the displeasure of the Secretary of Defense. (3) As a result, the Air Force began to develop a better expeditionary capability. The Harvest Bare concept was born and has evolved into a robust, mobile expeditionary capability. Today, the Air Force has a variety of bare-base assets that can be tailored to meet service needs across the spectrum of conflict. Yet, while these assets remain mobile, they are not agile, and the current prepositioning strategy is focused mainly on two regions of the world--the Korean peninsula and Southwest Asia. To improve Air Force agility in establishing bare-base operations, RAND and the Air Force Logistics Management Agency (AFLMA) analyzed current conditions separately and recommended potential solutions. RAND's focus has been more on improving agile combat support and centered on establishing forward operating locations (FOL) and forward support locations (FSL).

While their research is not focused on staging bare-base assets, using forward support locations puts key bare-base assets within 3,000 miles of any geographic location. Conversely, AFLMA focused its research on adding a sealift component for bare-base assets similar to the concept currently used for munitions. Its research centered on a cost-and-risk analysis comparing ship-basing and land-basing of bare-base assets. These two studies provide key strategies for improving the Air Force's ability to rapidly project expeditionary air forces anywhere in the world. This article compares the results of these two studies to determine which is the best option for meeting the needs of the expeditionary air force.