The path to integration: a look at the past, present, and potential future of integrating reserve and active flying units

Air Force Journal of Logistics, Summer, 2004 by Douglas E. Fick

It's (transformation) happening today here, at Robins AFB [George]. In the future, when other bases and other wings attempt to implement a Future Total Force initiative, those who follow will measure their success against the "Robins Model." (1)

--Dr James Roche, Secretary of the Air Force

Introduction

Dr Roche spoke these words to the men and women of the 116th Bomb Wing and 93d Air Control Wing (ACW) to mark the end of their units as separate reserve and active organizations. The two wings integrated into the 116th Air Control Wing with a makeup consisting of both active and reserve members. This event was significant in that it was the latest in a series of attempts by the Air Force to merge elements of the active and reserve components. With a year of experience behind it, the Robins Model will be used as a roadmap to integrate other units. (1)

Early attempts at integration met with failure, resulting in nearly a decade's passing before any effort in this area was made again. The two components will successfully meet the vision of Future Total Force only through a strong long-term commitment throughout the Air Force and Air Reserve Component (ARC). This article looks at the compelling factors that led to initial integration efforts, why they failed, where we now stand, and what the future benefits and challenges will be.

The Absorption Issue

Absorption of new pilots into the Air Force has been a challenge for rated officer assignment personnel and is perhaps the primary driving factor toward integrating active and ARC units. According to Air Force Instruction (AFI) 11-412, "Absorption is the number of inexperienced crewmembers who can be assigned to a major weapon system per year." (2) Before delving into the complexities of the absorption problem and why the ARC provides assistance toward resolution, it may be beneficial to use an analogy to get ah initial concept of absorption. In one aspect, an operational active component squadron can be viewed much like a factory. It takes in raw material (new inexperienced pilots not yet experienced in the applicable aircraft) and produces a product (the same pilot now seasoned and fully mission capable in the aircraft). The Air Force then uses the seasoned pilots to continue the training process or fill staff positions where their flying knowledge is critical.

Tools are required to perform this task. At its most basic, those tools are instructor pilots, other experienced pilots, and aircraft sorties. When the system is balanced, there is the right flow of new pilots to match the availability of instructors for initial training missions, the right mix of experienced pilots, and the capability to generate needed sorties. Problems arise when an one of the tools is insufficient.

Mismatches occur when there are too many inexperience pilots or there are not enough instructors and experienced pilots When this happens, inexperienced pilots do not have adequate access to tools to receive training on a consistent basis. This spreads out the process of seasoning, thus slowing the absorption of new pilots into the ranks of both experienced and instructor pilots. Compounding the problem even more is that flying is perishable skill. Skill building must be done on a regular basis of skills they had learned previously tend to erode. This further slows the Air Force's ability to season new pilots.

Causes of absorption mismatches are many and date back to the post-Vietnam era. In 1982, Master Sergeant Ed Martins writing for the Air Reservist, wrote:

   It's called an absorption problem. The Air Force does not have
   enough cockpits to train properly all the pilots coming into its
   flying units. They come from pilot training, instructor duty, and
   mission support areas. Putting these pilots into a limited number
   of cockpits would drive the experience mix toward unacceptably low
   levels. (3)

Pamela Kane, writing for the National Guard Magazine in 1981 stated:

   In the early 1980s, the problems were fueled by the fact that many
   experienced pilots opted for the airlines or the Air National Guard
   (ANG) and Air Force Reserve after the Vietnam conflict. Since the
   Vietnam drawdown, the need for active-duty pilots has diminished
   greatly. No war, no demand. Or so were the thoughts of the
   American public, which pressured Congress to limit military
   budgets. At the same time, the experienced pilots, like other
   well-trained servicemen, left the active Air Force and sought
   civilian pilot positions and the Air National Guard. (4)

The post-Vietnam era saw absorption challenges not only in experience loss but also in total number of sorties available. The situation did not improve in the 1990s.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, America's military force structure was addressed. It was believed the end of the Cold War would allow for a peace dividend, freeing up dollars by reducing military spending. During the 1990s, three separate review programs were implemented in an attempt to size the military for what was believed to be the level of threat for the start of the next century.