German wonder weapons: degraded production and effectiveness

Air Force Journal of Logistics, Fall, 2003 by Todd J. Schollars

Introduction

World War II was the greatest conflagration this planet has ever known. It started as a few hegemonic nations annexing territory for economic reasons, then became an ideological battle between right and wrong, and finally ended in a battle of survival for Germany. Facing the Allies' unconditional surrender demands, the Germans combined fervent ideology, a powerful industrial base, and cutting-edge technology to produce weapons to stave off the Allied tide. The effort was mostly concentrated in developing air weapons, where Germany tried, and ultimately failed, to meet the dual and competing needs of strike and air defense. Germany developed several wonder weapons to overcome Allied quantitative superiority. Some of these weapons were obviously flights of fancy, while others served as the basis for many US and Soviet weapon systems in the Cold War. German wonder weapons were a cut above anything the Allies had, yet they were not able to change the tide of war because there were not enough of them on operational status. This fact generates two questions. First, why couldn't the Germans produce and deploy their advanced technology in any effective numbers? Second, if German wonder weapons had reached the front in quantity, would they have made a difference in the war's outcome?

The Wonder Weapons

Germany produced a large number of hightechnology weapons during World War II. However, unlike the Allies' atomic bomb, electronic warfare, or Norden bombsight, the Germans were unable to reap benefits from their investment.

The Messerschmitt Me 262 is, along with the V1 and V2, the best known of Germany's wonder weapons. It could fly at more than 540 miles per hour (compared to the P-51's 437 miles per hour); had an operational ceiling of 37,000 feet; and packed a punch with its four heavy, fast-firing 30-millimeter MK 108 cannon concentrated in the nose. (1) It was so far advanced beyond other fighters that General Adolf Galland, commander of Luftwaffe fighters, declared on his first flight, "It felt as if an angel was pushing." (2) The technology behind this superb aircraft was the turbojet engine, which produced more power than piston engines and created less drag than a propeller. The amazing performance of the turbojets shocked Allied aircrews when they first saw the Me 262. It could easily outrun escort fighters, allowing Luftwaffe pilots to dictate the terms of combat. This was especially important for overcoming the Allies' quantitative advantage. Once they were in close, they could deliver devastating fire from their cannon and rocket armament; only a few hits could bring down a heavy bomber. (3) The Me 262 clearly made Allied air leaders nervous because it represented the potential for Germany to regain air superiority. However, the aircraft was not without problems.

The turbojets of the 1940s were still in their infant stage and required delicate care from pilots and maintenance personnel alike. Any sudden throttle movements could cause an engine flameout, resulting in deceleration and a lengthy engine restart--not ideal when a pilot was in combat. The high speeds made formation flying difficult, complicating the concentrated attacks essential to breaking up bomber formations. (4) Both these limitations required highly experienced pilots, something Germany would find in short supply late in the war. Additionally, maintaining the Junkers Jumo 004 engine was time-consuming and needed considerable skill, also in short supply. Each engine had a life of about 15 to 25 hours before needing replacement, (5) creating both maintenance and logistics supply headaches. Rarely did an Me 262 geschwader (wing with 60 to 90 aircraft) have more than 16 serviceable aircraft for a mission. (6) Even with these problems, the Me 262 was still a potential war winner, if not for production and operational obstacles.

Germany was an early pioneer of air-to-air and air-to-ground rockets and missiles. One of the simplest, yet most effective was the R4M unguided rocket. The Me 262 could carry 24 of these small, simple, easy-to-produce weapons. Their size belied their strength: fired from outside the range of American .50 caliber defensive guns, one R4M had "indescribable efficiency--firing a salvo would hit several bombers--one rocket would kill them." (7) The attacks had the added benefit of breaking up bomber formations, making them more vulnerable to other Luftwaffe fighters. R4Ms also had the same ballistic characteristics as the MK 108 cannon, meaning the Me 262 could use the same sight for both weapons. (8) A more advanced weapon was the X-4, a finstabilized, liquid propellant, air-to-air missile, having a speed of 600 miles per hour and a range of 3.7 miles. After firing it from an Me 262 or Focke-Wulf Fw 190, the pilot would guide it to the bomber target via a wire connecting the missile and launching aircraft. Then the missile would detonate on impact or with an acoustic fuze. (9) The guidance system had the major disadvantage that the pilot could not maneuver his airplane while guiding the X-4, a serious problem considering Allied escort fighters. Germany was developing an acoustically guided version, using a type of sonar to reach the target and explode, but the war ended before it was ready. Had the Germans deployed the R4M or X-4 in significant numbers, it could have dented the Allied bomber offensive. Moreover, since the Luftwaffe was primarily a striking force, German scientists did not confine themselves to air-to-air missiles.