German wonder weapons: degraded production and effectiveness

Air Force Journal of Logistics, Fall, 2003 by Todd J. Schollars

Germany's advanced technology production problems lay both in the character of the industry and pervasive military interference from project inception through delivery. First, German industry was craftsman-based to deliver very complicated weapons. (30) This was ideal for creating wonder weapons but made it nearly impossible to mass-produce them. Second, the armaments industry spread its capacity over several different specialized designs. Instead of a core of proven aircraft, German industry had 425 types, (31) once again hindering mass production and limiting the number of advanced aircraft produced. The reason behind this structure was military fastidiousness--the Wehrmacht liked working with specialized craftsmen because they could respond to the field's demands for weapon changes. (32) These changes did make the weapons more effective, but the constantly changing specifications made mass production impossible. No engineers or industrialists were consulted before making changes, (33) creating inefficiencies that further limited production. Finally, the Luftwaffe's first transformation came during the 1930s, when it could upgrade its equipment in peacetime. Conversely, the Allies had to transform early in the war; then stuck with late 1930's technology pushed to its limits, a huge production capacity overcame any qualitative shortfalls. However, Germany tried to transform to wonder weapons late in the war. Transitioning to a superior model in war actually can cause substandard combat readiness and degraded logistics as operators and maintainers learn to deal with new technology. (34) The result was German industry produced too little, too late, and actually decreased the Luftwaffe's capability.

Political obstacles, military interference, and an industry ill-equipped to make advanced weapons combined to hinder the wonder weapons' deployment. The cause of these problems was a complete lack of strategic vision, which prevented effective campaign planning and long-term weapons production. The lack of vision began at the highest levels and set a tone of short-range thinking that permeated the Luftwaffe, ultimately crippling its ability to prosecute any kind of strategic warfare. Goering was an extremely able fighter pilot. During World War I, he took command of Manfred von Richthofen's Jasta when the Red Baron died in action. However, Goering never gained the technical and logistical perspective needed to command an entire air force. (35) Before the war, he abandoned the 10-year prewar plan for a well-staffed and exercised strategic air force in order to attain shortterm goals quickly. (36) The discarded plan included high-tech weapons, long-range strike aircraft, and the ability to put the German economy on a war basis before hostilities began. Even in early 1941, Goering could have pursued an aggressive program to increase German production but failed to do so. Luftwaffe military leaders also were more interested in active operations than preparing for the long term, because they desired tactical superiority at the expense of strategic readiness. This resulted from the massive catchup game Luftwaffe personnel played between the wars and made the officers technocrats and operations experts with limited vision. They could not relate airpower to national strategy, and the resulting defects were fatal. (37) When losses outstripped production in 1942, the Luftwaffe finally demanded construction increases. By the time the numbers caught up, there were not enough aircrews to fly them. (38) The only vision Germany had was a fanatical desire for a technological breakthrough to turn the tide of war, (39) relying on a belief in German superiority rather than reasoned strategic planning. Their fanatical desires not only diverted resources from realistic weapons programs but also gave the Allies targets for the Combined Bomber Offensive--the final impediment to German wonder weapons production.