1910s AD

Air Force Journal of Logistics, Fall, 2004 by Roger G. Miller

By May 1918, Air Service officials faced a serious shortage of mechanics in France and sought to draw on those in England. British air leaders, however, had become dependent on American manpower and opposed releasing American units until replacements had arrived in accordance with the 5 December 1917 agreement. "I am thoroughly convinced that if tomorrow the majority of American squadrons were to be removed from England," 1st Lieutenant T. P. Walker of the Air Service reported, "the Royal Air Force would be severely crippled, and at certain stations, their training would come to a complete standstill." (32) To resolve the problem, General Patrick, new chief of the Air Service, AEF, (33) met with the British air officials in London "and placed our situation clearly before them." Bowing to American needs, the British agreed to release 3,500 mechanics who, Patrick agreed, would be replaced as quickly as replacements from the States became available. (34)

In June 1918, the first five squadrons--the 49th, 50~h, 93d, 135th, and 213th Aero Squadrons--left England for France. As of 1 July, 72 squadrons were judged trained, and over the next few months, many of these rejoined the Air Service, AEF. All in all, the program provided a huge boost in trained maintenance personnel for the Air Service in France, as well as essential manpower for the Royal Flying Corps. The English program ultimately trained 22,059 men, of which 11,170 were sent to France. At least 18 of the 45 flying squadrons that fought with the Air Service on the Western Front received a major portion of their training in England. Other squadrons manned assembly plants, repair depots, flying fields, and airparks. Of those remaining in England, several were diverted to man the Handley-Page development program described below. Still others were in the personnel pipeline flowing to the Front when the armistice took effect. (35)

A large number of mechanics remained stuck in England, however, tied up by a program that, had the war lasted into 1919, might have led to an Air Service strategic bombing capability. The Handley-Page program grew out of the American desire to develop its own long-range bomber force. On 26 January 1918, Foulois signed an agreement with the British that provided for the manufacture in the United States of enough twin-engine Handley-Page bombers--powered by Liberty engines and equipped with all weapons, instruments, and accessories--to equip 30 American squadrons. These would be shipped to England in prefabricated pieces and assembled at production plants built especially for that purpose. The program also required shipping American personnel to England to construct the facilities required for the program, as well as providing enough mechanics to be trained to maintain the big airplanes. Final training for the squadrons would take place at several airfields in England. (36)

Work on the project began immediately. Assembly plants were established in two cotton mills near Oldham, and five airfields were identified as training sites. The Air Service shipped some 3,000 carpenters, bricklayers, and laborers to England to prepare these facilities. Instruction for the flying squadrons began at sites in the United States and continued in England using ten Handley-Page bombers borrowed from the British, powered by Liberty engines loaned by the US Navy. Unfortunately, as already noted, the project came to naught. First, the same kind of design and fabrication problems that delayed production of the De Havilland DH-4 and other aircraft afflicted the Handley-Page program. The big bomber comprised more than 100,000 parts, and construction was parceled out to several companies. But American industry proved incapable of making such a system function, and production quickly fell months behind schedule. By November 1918, only about 95 percent of the parts for 100 aircraft and less than 50 engines had reached England. Second, less than 60 percent of the production and assembly personnel reached England. Finally, bad weather, conflict with British trade unions, and frequent strikes delayed construction of the assembly facilities. (37) The one part of the program that worked well, unfortunately, was the shipping of several thousand potential mechanics to England for training. There they remained, waiting for aircraft that never arrived. Colonel Hem-y H. Arnold, later commander of the US Army Air Forces during World War II, concluded, "The only result [of the Handley-Page program] was that the American air outfits in France were deprived of their needed services." (38)