Logistics and the Battle of Britain

Air Force Journal of Logistics, Winter, 2000 by Peter J. Dye

Introduction

It is arguable that the Battle of Britain was lost long before the Second World War started. Luftwaffe doctrine, so successful in establishing a powerful synergy between air and land operations, was deeply flawed in its understanding of the fundamentals of airpower. The causes were various, but the result was inadequate provision for the industrial investment and resources necessary to sustain operations in the face of high wastage rates that war would bring. By contrast, the Royal Air Force (RAF) was well placed to defend Great Britain, notwithstanding its perceived doctrinal emphasis on strategic bombing. As Richard Overy recently pointed out, the contest the country faced after Dunkirk had been anticipated and prepared for in the 1930s. [1] The Air Ministry, planning the rapid expansion of the front line, had clearly understood the lessons of the First World War, in particular, the high cost--in human and materiel terms--of sustaining air operations. [2] By providing the proper economic and logistics basis for realizing these plans, the air staffs had also established the foundation for increasing Allied air superiority as the war progressed. This is not to say their prewar planning was without flaws. Indeed, at a tactical and operational level, the Luftwaffe enjoyed self-evident advantages. However, by getting the fundamentals right and being prepared to learn from painful early reverses, the Royal Air Force placed itself in a significantly stronger position than the Luftwaffe to fight the Battle of Britain.

None of this is to deny the huge importance of technology, tactics, and leadership or the courage of individual pilots in determining the final outcome. No doubt these issues will continue to dominate the debate on the conduct of the Battle of Britain much as they have for the last 60 years. But the possibility of a Luftwaffe victory was effectively compromised by plans, laid down in the prewar period, that provided Fighter Command with a quantitative advantage and the means to sustain this advantage.

This article seeks to clarify the part played by logistics in the Battle of Britain and how it shaped the outcome. For brevity, the analysis focuses primarily on the single-seat fighters deployed by the respective air forces. It was in this arena that the Luftwaffe needed to prevail if it were to achieve air superiority over southern England and, in so doing, defeat the Royal Air Force.

Wastage

As the prospect of war grew ever stronger, the Royal Air Force turned to the First World War for insight. While it was recognised that technology had progressed considerably since 1918, it was expected that the problems in prosecuting a modern war would be familiar, albeit more acute. In a paper delivered to the Royal United Services Institute in 1934, the difficulties facing a technical service preparing for the next war were explored in some detail, particularly the question of how to make good wastage. [3] Chairing the meeting was Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, who had been largely responsible for the development of the highly efficient logistics system that supported the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Air Force on the Western Front. [4] In a review of the key issues, it was stated that the average life of an aircraft in war was 2 months, a view shared by Sir Robert, who referred to the 45 percent monthly attrition rate suffered by the Royal Air Force between March and October 1918. [5] Wastage could only be made good from three sources: manufacturing, reserves, and repair. As matters stood, it was unlikely that either industry or the Service depots could satisfy the demand. Accordingly, for the Royal Air Force to prosecute the next war, it needed a greatly expanded peacetime establishment, high production rates, larger repair depots, additional skilled technical personnel, an emphasis on quantity over quality (in the sense of balancing production against continuous progress), long preparation, and careful planning.

Such public pronouncements were matched by the Air Staff's own calculations in Memorandum No 50 (Secret Document 78), first issued in 1933, which provided data for the calculation of consumption and wastage in war. [6] The monthly wastage rate for single-seat fighters engaged in Home Defence was assessed to be 100 percent and that for single-seat pilots 30 percent. Thus, it was anticipated that a fighter force of 50 squadrons engaged in active operations would suffer wastage of 1,000 aircraft a month. Assuming the depots could repair 50 percent of these machines, industry would need to produce 500 new aircraft a month just to maintain front-line strength. [7] In order to cope with peaks in attrition and the inevitable delay in mobilizing industrial production, reserves equal to at least 6 weeks' wastage would also be required (some 1,500 aircraft). Finally, approximately 300 new fighter pilots would be needed each month, although it was recognised that dilution would be a major factor in determining whether operational effectiveness could be sustained. [8] Interestingly, given that prewar RAF planners were only interested in strategic bombing, it was further stated, "Home Defence was the most important commitment that the Service had to prepare for." [9]