Operational-level analysis: DoD's strategic mobility and logistics support to the homeland security architecture

Air Force Journal of Logistics, Winter, 2006 by James D. Hamilton, Paul R. Murphy

Introduction

On September 11, 2001 (9/11) the United States appeared powerless in the face of a sudden asymmetrical terrorist air attack on several key centers of national power. While the nation rallied in the wake of the attacks, most notably with heroic consequence management efforts in hardest-hit New York City, it also braced itself for follow-on incidents that could range from weapons-laden container ships through the specter of dirty bombs in the American heartland. The US defense establishment was hard pressed to explain how the mightiest military on earth had let the country down. Meanwhile, all departments of the Federal government scrambled to demonstrate resolve in cooperatively fixing the apparent breach in civil-military defenses.

Toward this effort, the United States reorganized its homeland support structure, creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and establishing United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) as the single unified command for homeland defense and civil support. (1) To better organize itself for emergency response, the DHS integrated the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the United States Coast Guard. (2) These comprehensive changes to the national response structure were designed to increase overall responsiveness to catastrophic events whether caused by an act of terrorism or an act of nature. Yet, although no apparent follow-on deliberate attack has occurred since, the national-level crisis apparatus was tested in the Gulf Coast region of the United States in 2005 with the Hurricane Katrina disaster response, and found wanting--4 full years after 9/11.

The United States homeland security command architecture is extremely complex. Integrating a coherent strategic logistics management process to support this architecture is even more complex. The command architecture is so challenging that very few government officials fully understand how it currently works. Even Department of Defense (DoD) logistics experts are hard-pressed to differentiate parts of problems from parts of solutions. This article examines and synthesizes several essential research areas in order to form a comprehensive analysis of DoD's deployment and distribution architecture to support homeland security. It proposes that the Federal National Response Plan (NRP) is analogous to an interdepartmental coalition operation, and hence can learn from, and possibly model the attributes inherent in a military coalition structure. The analysis culminates with recommendations to enhance DoD's critical role in the homeland security architecture.

This research has three overarching conclusions. First, there is a demarcation of two concentric logistics and mobility missions. One can be thought of as tactical relief operations inside the Joint task force (JTF) Joint operating area (JOA), while the other is the intratheater or operational and strategic movement via common-user, DoD airlift and other mobility assets. Second, this article concludes that the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR), in both the Homeland defense and Homeland security support mission realms, has a requirement for operational and strategic logistics and mobility management--these are within the purview of United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). These functions need not be replicated by USNORTHCOM because they are already resident at USTRANSCOM. Third, operational and strategic logistical and mobility planning for incidents of national significance cannot wait until requests are made by overwhelmed lead federal agencies.

Analysis begins with a review of the legal foundation that established the framework for the DHS and the rules that guide the federal response architecture. It includes the presidential directives and legal underpinnings most important to DoD support of civilian and military authorities. Next, it lays out the national-level solution of federal reorganization designed to foster closer interagency cooperation. It explains the national incident response structure within which DoD is expected to serve as a support functionary.

Next, the article discusses the fundamental differences of the principles of unity of effort and unity of command to explore the limitations on civil-military cooperative command arrangements. The article dwells on the purpose, history, and structure of the unified command plan (UCP) in order to comprehend the military's worldwide organizational architecture and USNORTHCOM's and USTRANSCOM's respective positions within it. The history of the UCP reveals how DoD organization has developed to support operations inside North America, both for homeland defense and for supporting civilian authorities. Further the UCP allows mission-specific divisions inside the United States that are unique to the homeland AOR. It also touches on the distinguishing characteristics of geographic and functional commands in order to highlight the nuances of supporting operations inside sovereign US territory.