The War Powers Resolution: A Rationale for Congressional Inaction

Parameters, Spring, 2001 by Timothy S. Boylan, Glenn A. Phelps

Three months earlier, on 1 October 1990, House Resolution 658 had been introduced, seeking to support the actions already taken by the President in the Middle East. Its sponsors pointed out that the resolution was not in conflict with the War Powers Resolution, since there had been numerous, ongoing meetings in August and September between House members and committees and the President and his senior advisors. Further, they were careful to show that HR 658 would not become another Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, as it held the President to the use of deterrent force only and did not grant an open-ended authorization. [13] The call for action on HR 658 reveals a familiar theme:

Thus, the very spirit of War Powers is carried out by virtue of the fact that we bring this resolution to the floor so members can vote on it. . . or against it--because without that we have nothing.

We would be saying, in effect, "Let the President take the lead and do whatever he wants to; we will sit back and see which way the wind blows and then decide what we are going to do or how we are going to do it or what we are going to say about it." [14]

Those opposed to HR 658 did not accept the "take action" challenge. Many who voiced agreement with its substance nonetheless opposed it because it "fails to meet the very specific requirements set down by the War Powers Act, and thereby undermines the law." [15] For others, the 9 August 1990 letter from President Bush detailing his actions in response to the Iraqi invasion did not constitute sufficient reporting. "President Bush should have and should now send an update." The 60-day clock and timing requirement, which had been absent from the debate until this point, had been rediscovered--and some believed it was ticking:

We are now within a week of the 60-day limit. Therefore, the War Powers Act requires us to take one of the specified actions, or the troops must be withdrawn. I believe we should now be voting, not on this resolution, but on a 60-day extension. [16]

We cannot duck our responsibility. We must demand a 4(a)1 report from the President defining the scope, the duration, the objectives of our deployment in the gulf, and then we must vote aye or no on the written record. [17]

After months of extensive communication by the President, and after two months of regular meetings between congressional members and presidential advisors, some representatives still seemingly lacked enough information to cast an informed vote. It is not possible to tell from the written record whether the above-quoted Representative believed that more complete information was lacking, or that he absolutely needed a formal 4(a)1 report from the President, and that no other form of communication, no matter how plentiful and detailed, would suffice.

The October 1990 debates once again found members of Congress arguing over the fine points of procedure and interpretation, while seemingly oblivious to the fact that the term specified in the War Powers Resolution was fast drawing to a close and some affirmative action was expected. The issue of timing occupied the minds of many in these debates. Yet, the concern was over the President's adherence to the 60-day clock. Had he, in fact, reported? Had the clock begun?