Xenophon's March: Into the Lair of the Persian Lion. . - book review

Parameters, Spring, 2003 by Dr. J. Boone Bartholomees

Xenophon's March: Into the Lair of the Persian Lion. By John Prevas. Cambridge, Mass.: Da Capo Press, 2002.225 pages. $27.50.

The march through much of ancient Persia by 10,000 Greek mercenaries in support of the pretender Cyrus the Younger and their fighting retreat to Greece after the defeat of their employer is one of the most familiar tales from the ancient world. The young Athenian Xenophon, who joined the expedition as a staff member of a friend and rose to be one of its primary commanders during the retreat, wrote an eloquent and detailed account of the expedition that is one of the major surviving primary sources in all of ancient military history. Surprisingly, the academic world is not awash in quality translations of Xenophon's Anabasis (much less his secondary but equally valuable works). However, this book does not address that issue-it is not a translation of Anabasis. What John Prevas has done with Xenophon's March: Into the Lair of the Persian Lion is provide an interesting, readable, and reliable interpretation of Anabasis with the added twist of some modem analysis of the terrain Xenophon's army traversed.

Prevas leans heavily on Xenophon--as one must expect, since he is the exclusive available source--citing seven primary manuscripts or fragments from various periods and a slew of mainly 18th-and 19th-century translations. What he adds to this familiar tale is the benefit of having personally traveled the route-as best as that can be reconstructed-and visited the places he describes. This is an interesting technique for recounting marches (Prevas's earlier book was about Hannibal's march over the Alps), but one must hasten to point out that Xenophon's March is neither a travel guide nor a travelogue. One gets the benefit of descriptions of terrain by a firsthand observer without either the how-to-get-there details or the story of the local inhabitants that characterizes those genres. The story, not the travel aspect of the book, is its primary value.

Prevas has a lucid style that gives vivid insight into warfare in the period around 390 B.C.E. One senses the frustration of leading free-spirited Greek soldiers who wanted to be consulted on and even vote on every issue-tactical, strategic, or administrative. One senses too the logistical difficulties of a large force moving through hostile territory in the face of active opposition and the symbiotic economic relationship between an ancient army and the local populace.

The mercenaries invariably solved their logistics problems by sanctioned looting unless the local population was especially friendly or ethnically Greek. In those cases, the soldiers ventured further afield to loot (presumably the villages of an enemy of their hosts). The frequent need for the Greek mercenaries to divest themselves of accumulated wealth--especially slaves--to facilitate mobility through particularly difficult stages of the journey and their hesitance to do an especially thorough job of that task reflect directly the economics of the period. If their employer would not or could not provide cash, they simply pillaged the closest available town. Since the disposable wealth of the typical village in the heart of ancient Persia (or anywhere else) was limited, the residents themselves became the primary loot.

One sees even more clearly the superiority of the disciplined Greek infantry over any force the Persians could throw against them. One of the principal contemporary results of the journey of the 10,000 was the recognition that the vaunted Persian empire was actually hollow, and that the Greeks could prevail on almost any battlefield. The loss at Cunaxa (394 B.C.E.) was attributable to Cyrus and his Persian units and not to the performance of the Greek mercenaries, who had actually swept the field before them. Alexander of Macedon would exploit that information not long after Xenophon's death.

One also gets a vivid picture of the horror with which the mainland Greek city-states greeted the return of the marauding adventurers. It is easy to sympathize with their hesitance to allow a large, armed, trained, and disciplined force--which had existed for years by pillaging--to mosey around Greece with no visible means of support. In a sense, Xenophon illustrates all the advantages and disadvantages of mercenary armies-both ancient and modern.

The story of Xenophon's 10,000 is undeniably a great tale that is still of interest to the modern soldier. John Prevas does a good job of telling it. The expert on ancient warfare should read Xenophon's March as the latest contribution on the subject. The novice should read it as an easy and enjoyable way to learn about this famous episode in ancient history.

Dr. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., Professor of Military History, US Army War College.