The United States and Coercive Diplomacy - book - Book Review

Parameters, Spring, 2004 by Alan G. Stolberg

The United States and Coercive Diplomacy. Edited by Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003. 442 pages. $45.00 ($19.95 paper).

Frederick the Great, the 18th-century Prussian monarch, is reputed to have said that diplomacy without arms is like music without the instruments. From Frederick's perspective, diplomats clearly were not going to have much chance at success unless they had the support of the profession o farms. Even with the backing of the armed forces, the diplomats could still fail. This was especially true if a state was attempting to coerce or compel another state to undo something significant that it had already initiated. In fact, it would appear from the findings of The United States and Coercive Diplomacy that even with all appropriate support mechanisms in place, including the armed forces, the chances for a state's coercive diplomatic strategy to succeed are still marginal.

Building on the foundation of coercive diplomacy theory developed in the Cold War era by the legendary Stanford professor Alexander George, editors Robert Art, noted professor of international relations at Brandeis University, and Patrick Cronin, former director of research and studies at the US Institute of Peace and current assistant administrator for the State Department's Agency for International Development, set out to determine the potential for coercive diplomacy to succeed in the post-Cold War world. In this work they focus the research of seven fine authors to assess the viability of the coercive diplomacy approach to a spectrum of crisis situations that America has found itself in since 1991.

The evaluation of regional and functional issues ranging from Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Haiti, to North Korea, China-Taiwan, Iraq, and the war on terror is viewed through the prism of a coercive diplomacy that seeks a behavioral change in an adversarial state by compelling it to either stop doing something it is currently doing, or begin doing something it had not been doing. Two primary types of coercion are identified: the diplomatic threat of the use of force, and the actual employment of force on a limited scale. The use of force can either be a demonstration or limited employment, in either case to convince the target state of the coercer's determination to resolve the crisis in its favor. In addition to the stick approach of diplomatic and military threats, a state also can use carrot-like inducements such as the transfer of resources or the offer of other things for tangible benefit. Most important, coercive diplomacy should never be viewed as an option unless the coercing state is prepared for the failure of this approach, ultimately requiring either the full use of all-out armed force or acquiescence to the target state's desires.

The authors make it clear early on that coercive diplomacy is difficult at best. While these efforts can convey the increasing probability of more punishment to come should the target state fail to comply, if the target state does not fear the coercing state or if the target state cares more about the goals of its efforts than the coercing state, any amount of coercive diplomacy is bound to break down. US attempts to diplomatically coerce Somali warlords, Serbia over Kosovo, North Korean nuclear efforts, and Iraq on WMD disarmament were judged failures because in each case the target state felt that it had much more to lose than the damage that the application of limited American force would produce. US attempts in the war on terror to compel either state or sub-state actors to refrain from the execution of support for terror strikes were considered to be failures, with the possible exception of deterring Iraq by the US strike on Iraqi intelligence headquarters in 1993 in response to a reported plan to assassinate former President Bush. It was determined that radical Islamic terror movements were simply too motivated to be compelled not to strike.

Combining the data from this study with Alexander George's assessment of a number of other cases during the Cold War indicates that coercive diplomacy can be depended upon for success only about 25 or 30 percent of the time. Motivation for the states involved remains the key variable. It all comes down to how badly a state or sub-state actor believes it needs to do something. If it perceives that it wants or needs something bad enough, it will endure, whatever the cost, thus negating the impact of coercive diplomacy and its limited use of force.

This is all the more reason why this study is so critical at this time in American and global history. Future threats of the 21st century, like transnational terrorism and North Korean nuclear proliferation, will remain key tests for coercive diplomatic theorists and policymakers alike. The evidence tells us that this approach is unlikely to work in these cases because the target actors are so intensely motivated. As a result, serious students and policymakers need to read this superb work as part of their efforts to develop alternate approaches, including the application of force well beyond anything simply considered coercive.