The Grand Strategy of the Russian Empire, 1650-1831

Parameters, Spring, 2005 by William H. Mengel

The Grand Strategy of the Russian Empire, 1650-1831. By John P. LeDonne. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 261 pages. $60.00.

The decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union has seen a renewed interest in the study of pre-1917 Russia, among scholars both within and outside the former USSR. On the surface, the removal of communism as a unifying ideology has ruptured continuities in Russian foreign policy and made the analysis of Russian strategic thought more problematic, while former Soviet republics searching for new identities and roles in the post-Cold War era have added complexity to the situation. John LeDonne, a prominent political scientist specializing in the history of early Tsarist Russia, has developed an analytical framework for understanding Russian "grand strategy" during the period of imperial expansion from 1650 to 1831. LeDonne's model supports his argument for a continuity of Russian strategic goals and policies, determined to a large extent by geopolitical concerns, many of which remain relevant to 21st-century Russia.

LeDonne uses "grand strategy" to refer to Russian efforts to use political, military, and economic means to achieve hegemony over the Heartland, a vast continental area which included the territory of the former Soviet Union, as well as Eastern Europe, Turkey, and Iran. In LeDonne's model, based on the concepts of Halford Mackinder, the Heartland is surrounded by two groups of Coastland states: the European Coastland on the west, and the Monsoon Coastland on the east. The framework of this geopolitical model is the subject of LeDonne's previous book, The Russian Empire and the World: 1700-1917 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1997). The Grand Strategy of the Russian Empire differs from The Russian Empire and the World more in structure and organization than in content; the second book is organized chronologically, as opposed to geographically, and has a narrower focus, examining the components of the Russian policy of expansion. The basic outlines of LeDonne's analysis remain the same: Russia pursued an aggressive policy of expansion in the 18th century, the nature of which was largely determined by geopolitical considerations. The first book examines why Russia expanded, using an argument based on geopolitical determinism, while the second book examines how Russia expanded, analyzing the development and key tenets of the Russian strategic vision and the means of achieving this vision.

LeDonne is convinced Russia had a comprehensive, cohesive, and aggressive grand strategy, originating by the mid-17th century, with the ultimate goal of achieving hegemony over the maritime basins of the Baltic, Black, Caspian, and Aral seas, and the Arctic coast of Asia. The author argues Russia developed three pillars to support its expansionist policy: the use of deep strategic military strikes (following the Mongol model), maintaining a standing army as a strategic force concentrated in the Muscovite core region, and fostering client states and societies in border areas.

His narrative begins in 1650, when the Romanov dynasty was "ready to stake a claim" in the Baltic, resulting in a three-way zero-sum game between Russia, Poland, and Sweden. Russian expansion achieved its greatest success in the 18th century, adhering to Petrine grand strategy, which, in turn, traced its roots to the geopolitical vision of Afanasii Ordin-Nashchokin in the mid-17th century. Under Peter the Great, Russia began grand offensive campaigns in all three theaters (Western, Southern, and Eastern), using a series of long-range penetrations to destabilize opponents. LeDonne describes the 1714 expeditions of Bukhgolts and Cherkassi to Irtysh and Khiva, the 1716 expedition to Copenhagen, and the 1722-23 operations in the Transcaucasus as examples of these deep strategic penetrations. In the 1720s, the strategic military forces were concentrated around Moscow, able to deploy to any theater, while a series of fortified lines were constructed along the outer perimeters to provide a defense in depth. This deployment pattern would be altered in the second half of the 18th century, when the strategic forces were deployed in the periphery, and performed the additional role of infrastructure development, particularly in the south.

The third pillar of Russian grand strategy, the client system, allowed Russia to "maximize imperial influence and diplomatic control while minimizing the use of force by the regular army." As Russia expanded to optimum lines of conquest within the Heartland, such as the Gulf of Bothnia, the Danube River, and the Black Sea, control of territory beyond these "moats" was maintained by accommodating client states such as Poland and Georgia, and client societies such as the Cossacks, Kalmyks, and Baltic Germans. This system was enhanced by keeping Sweden and the Ottoman Empire weak, and through collaboration with Austria and Prussia.

LeDonne also briefly describes the use of economic policy to prop up Petrine grand strategy, through the creation of a military-industrial complex in the early 18th century. Encouragement of iron production in the Urals and armaments factories at Tula were soon followed by protective tariffs in 1724. LeDonne argues an "autarkic outlook became a necessary prerequisite to the formulation of a grand strategy seeking hegemony in the Heartland," as economic penetration by outside powers would "undermine a hegemony based on raw military power and obedient clients."