Lessons from a successful counterinsurgency: the Philippines, 1899-1902

Parameters, Spring, 2005 by Timothy K. Deady

Strategy is the manner in which a nation employs its national power to achieve policy goals and a desired end-state. The "center of gravity" is an important concept for understanding how and where to employ the elements of power. The concept's originator, Carl von Clausewitz, identified it as the source of the enemy's "power and movement, upon which everything depends." (10) Current US doctrine extends the concept to both belligerents in a conflict and differentiates between strategic and operational levels of the center of gravity. (11) The essence of strategy then is to apply the elements of power to attack the enemy's centers of gravity and to safeguard one's own.

The Filipino insurgents accurately targeted the US strategic center of gravity--the national willpower as expressed by the Commander-in-Chief and supported by his superiors, the voting public. The American populace's will to victory was the powerful key that brought the nation's formidable elements of power to bear.

America's source of operational power, its operational center of gravity, was the forces fielded in the Philippines. Particularly important were the small garrisons. Their ability to eliminate local resistance pacified regions and kept them peaceful. From 53 garrisons in May 1900 when Otis departed, American presence had expanded to over 500 by the time Aguinaldo was captured. (12) Largely isolated from higher-echelon control, small garrisons lived and worked in communities. They tracked and eliminated insurgents, built rapport with the populace, gathered intelligence, and implemented civil works. The process was slow, but once an area was pacified it was effectively denied to the insurgency.

Filipino Policy and Centers of Gravity

Although a full evaluation of Filipino insurgent strategy is beyond the scope of this article, its effect on the United States must be considered. The goal, or end-state, sought by the Filipino insurgency was a sovereign, independent, socially stable Philippines led by the illustrado oligarchy.

Local chieftains, landowners, and businessmen were the principales who controlled local politics. The insurgency was strongest when illustrados, principales, and peasants were unified in opposition to annexation. The peasants, who provided the bulk of guerilla manpower, had interests different from their illustrado leaders and the principales of their villages. Coupled with the ethnic and geographic fragmentation, unity was a daunting task. The challenge for Aguinaldo and his generals was to sustain unified Filipino public opposition; this was the insurrectos' strategic center of gravity.

The Filipino operational center of gravity was the ability to sustain its force of 100,000 irregulars in the field. The Filipino General Francisco Macabulos described the insurrection's aim as, "not to vanquish the [US Army] but to inflict on them constant losses." (13) They sought to initially use conventional (later guerilla) tactics and an increasing toll of US casualties to contribute to McKinley's defeat in the 1900 presidential election. Their hope was that as President the avowedly anti-imperialist William Jennings Bryan would withdraw from the Philippines. They pursued this short-term goal with guerilla tactics better suited to a protracted struggle. While targeting McKinley motivated the insurgents in the short term, his victory demoralized them and convinced many undecided Filipinos that the United States would not depart precipitately. (14)