Lessons from a successful counterinsurgency: the Philippines, 1899-1902

Parameters, Spring, 2005 by Timothy K. Deady

Taft negotiated the purchase of 400,000 acres of prime farmland from the Vatican for $7.2 million, more than its actual value. Although the land could have been appropriated, the purchase kept the church, which had performed many municipal government functions under the Spanish, from resisting the US administration. Filipino peasants gained a significant benefit by purchasing parcels of land from the American administration. The US land purchase and resale was astute. It offered benefits that could not be matched by the insurgents to two constituencies. It also served as a wedge issue that separated the interests of the peasant guerillas from their land-owning principale leaders. (39)

Sometimes curbing economic power aided US efforts. Congress barred large landholdings by American citizens or corporations. (40) By avoiding even the appearance of any ulterior motive or conflict of interest, America strengthened its claim to benevolence.

The weapon collection policy also merits a mention. When implemented in 1899, a 30-peso bounty was initially a dismal failure, with only a few dozen weapons turned in nationwide. By 1901, when coupled with other successful pacification policies, it was common for hundreds of rifles to be surrendered by disbanding insurgent groups. The lesson is that any given tactic, technique, or procedure employed in isolation may fail, but as part of a comprehensive mix of carrots and sticks can be part of an effective program.

In summarizing the application of the tools of American power, it bears repeating that they were not uniformly employed. They varied by region and evolved over time. One district commander, Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell, identified his civil functions as head of the police, judiciary, civil administration, mail, telegraph, tax collection, and road construction activities. (41) Having unified control of the elements of power enabled Bell and his counterparts to effectively orchestrate the counterinsurgency.

Lessons Learned

The campaign holds a number of lessons at the strategic and operational levels that are valuable for those planning and conducting stability operations. (42) Pacifying the Philippines proved to be more difficult than anyone had predicted. A total of 126,468 US soldiers served there, with troop strength averaging 40,000.

Negligible insurgent activity did not mean victory. Major General Otis headed home in May 1900 convinced that he had succeeded in suppressing the insurrection; yet the war continued for more than two years. Rebel sources subsequently revealed that the early 1900 lull was a period of reorganization and reconstitution.

Effective strategy and tactics took time to develop. There was considerable local variation in the tactics, techniques, and procedures used. American officers implemented forms of civil government often contrary to guidance from the Office of the Military Governor. Some permitted elections; when none were willing to serve, other commanders appointed Filipino leaders.