Transnational terrorism and the al Qaeda model: Confronting new realities

Parameters, Summer, 2002 by Paul J. Smith

A state policy of preemptive assassinations, which most likely would be couched in such euphemistic phrases as "permissive termination" or "calculated elimination," may be deemed necessary and politically expedient, and yet would remain anathema to the traditional and honorable soldiering ideal that has bonded military forces, particularly in Western states, for multiple generations. This contradiction will have to be managed head-on; otherwise it may result in diminished morale and civilian misunderstanding. As one analyst has noted: "Western countries have been disinclined to prepare for military action that was considered uncivilized." (50) Civilized or not, states may be required to engage in such actions if the threat of transnational terrorism--with its current predisposition for mass casualties--is to be contained or averted.

Another morally complicated issue involves state use of torture during interrogation. When Abdul Hakim Murad was questioned by Philippine investigators in 1995, he was reportedly subjected to various forms of torture. At one stage in the interrogation, Philippine authorities allegedly deceived Murad into believing that Israeli Mossad agents were behind his interrogation. Whether because of that or for other reasons, Murad eventually confessed the details of Oplan Bojinka. In this case, aggressive interrogation techniques, while arguably morally abhorrent and distasteful, effectively served their purpose. Thousands of innocent civilians did not die in early 1995 because of information gained through these methods.

Traditionally, the United States and certain other Western countries have skirted the torture dilemma by "exporting" their difficult candidates to states and regimes known to engage in the practice--such as Egypt--with full knowledge that interrogation with torture would likely take place. (51) Yet such a practice of "vicarious torture" is imbued with an obvious hypocrisy that prevents the sending state--such as the United States--from having clean hands when it engages in such practices. Moreover, obtaining human intelligence from foreign governments is fraught with its own downside risk: such intelligence, filtered through a foreign government, may contain information tainted by that government's biases or hidden policy objectives.

There is no easy answer to the thorny issue of interrogation involving the application of torture. From a moral and legal perspective, the answer would seem to be a clear-cut no, don't do it. From a practical perspective, moreover, torture can be counterproductive, eliciting a resolve of defiance within the individual being interrogated, and the intelligence so gained may be unreliable. But in the harsh world of transnational terrorism, the reality is far from black and white. As one terrorism expert recently wrote, intelligence is the key weapon against global terrorism, but intelligence does not come cheaply and, moreover, "Americans still do not appreciate the enormously difficult--and morally complex--problem that the imperative to gather 'good intelligence' entails." (52) In a conversation between that writer and a Sri Lankan army officer credited with thwarting attacks by the ruthless terrorist group the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the officer noted that terrorism could not be fought with l aws or moral dicta, but only by thoroughly "terrorizing" the terrorists--in other words, "inflicting on them the same pain that they inflict on the innocent." (53) In these murky aspects of dealing with terrorists, there are no easy answers.