Transnational terrorism and the al Qaeda model: Confronting new realities

Parameters, Summer, 2002 by Paul J. Smith

Conclusion

Al Qaeda's attack on the United States on 11 September 2001 was a major turning point in the evolution of international terrorism. In this case, the United States was attacked not by a fellow state, but a non-state terrorist organization. Al Qaeda represents the worst that globalization has to offer. Its transnational tentacles reach into every corner of the globe. Its ability to penetrate countries with passport fraud and other illegal immigration techniques is unparalleled, and its virus-like ability to infect indigenous groups--even those with originally benign goals--is now well-documented.

The lesson to be learned from al Qaeda is that terrorist groups can now exist in a transnational milieu, divorced from state-driven constraints. Even if we witness the demise of al Qaeda, we are not likely to witness the demise of its model. Terrorist groups can thrive in the dark pockets of anarchy that pervade the globe. But they can also coexist alongside their targets by planting cells in Western Europe and North America. The question thus becomes: Have we learned the lesson, and, moreover, are we prepared for the next attack?

NOTES

(1.) Regarding warnings about the rise of "catastrophic terrorism," see Ashton Carter et al., "Catastrophic Terrorism: Tacking the New Danger," Foreign Affairs, 77 (November/December 1998), 80.

(2.) Investigations conducted in Southeast Asia after the 11 September attacks in the United States provide linkages between Bojinka and the attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., suggesting that the former was possibly a blueprint for the latter. Specifically, certain key leaders of a newly discovered group, Jemaah Islamiah, have reported links to both plots. See Richard C. Paddock, "Southeast Asian Terror Exhibits Al Qaeda Traits," Los Angeles Times, 3 March 2002, p. A1.

(3.) This specific phrase was uttered by US Senator Richard Shelby on the CBS News Show Face the Nation on 16 September 2001 (file accessed through Lexis-Nexis).

(4.) Ed Blanche, "AI-Qaeda Recruitment," Jane's Intelligence Review, 14 (January 2002), 27-28.

(5.) Ed Blanche, "What the Investigation Reveals," Jane's Intelligence Review, 13 (November 2001), 16-17; see also article by John Mintz and Rom Jackman, "Finances Prompted Raids on Muslims," The Washington Post, 24 March 2001, p. A01.

(6.) A Biography of Osama bin Laden, background article for PBS documentary series Frontline, internet, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/bio.html, accessed 24 March 2002.

(7.) Osama bin Laden: A Chronology of His Political Life, background article for PBS documentary series Frontline, internet, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/etc/cron.html, accessed 24 March2002.

(8.) Peter L. Bergen, Holy War: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (New York: Free Press, 2001), p. 79.

(9.) Ibid., p. 85.

(10.) Ibid., p.86.

(11.) Indictment of Zacarias Moussaoui, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division (December 2001).