Transnational terrorism and the al Qaeda model: Confronting new realities

Parameters, Summer, 2002 by Paul J. Smith

As indicated above, al Qaeda's model has been to establish bases with indigenous groups throughout the world. Early in its existence, al Qaeda developed the ability to penetrate Islamic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to the point that it was "inseparably enmeshed with the religious, social, and economic fabric of Muslim communities worldwide." (17) In some cases, al Qaeda pursued a virtual "hands off" policy with its affiliated group. It may have guided or directed the group's operations, but at the same time required it to raise its own funds. Ahmed Ressam, who was intercepted entering the United States in December 1999 as part of the infamous "Millennium Plot," was part of a cell in Montreal, Canada, that survived by engaging in petty theft--including passport theft--and other crimes. However, for certain operations, such as the 11 September attacks in the United States, al Qaeda was much more willing to provide substantial and direct financial support.

Al Qaeda's strength lay in its reliance on a multi-cellular structure, spanning the entire globe, which gave the organization agility and cover. One French terrorism expert recently lamented, "If you have good knowledge of the [al Qaeda] network today, it's not operational tomorrow." (18) He compared its networks to a constantly changing virus that is impossible to totally grasp or destroy. Al Qaeda's multi-cellular international structure provided an ironic backdrop to President George Bush's proclamation that the United States would find terrorists wherever they were located and would consider attacking any nation that harbored terrorists. The uncomfortable reality is that many states--including those allied with the United States--harbored al Qaeda cells, but did nothing to neutralize them, either because they did not know of their presence (or the precise danger they posed) or were unwilling, for political or security reasons, to disrupt their operations. Certain German investigators, for instance, rueful ly admit that their lack of aggressive intervention--despite full awareness of al Qaeda's activities in many of its main cities--probably contributed to the 11 September tragedy.

As a truly transnational terrorist organization, al Qaeda has sought to expand beyond the traditional venue of the Middle East, Western Europe, North America, and South Asia. Increasingly the organization has pursued Southeast Asia as a key basing and staging region. Al Qaeda has long cultivated links with groups such as the Philippine-based Abu Sayyaf and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Indonesian group Laskar Jihad. Al Qaeda is also linked to region-wide organizations, such as Jemaah Islamiah, the mastermind of plots against the US Embassy in Singapore and other critical American and Western targets. In late September 2001, the Philippine military's chief of staff confirmed speculation that al Qaeda was seeking to support the Abu Sayyaf Group with "materiel, leadership, and training support." (19) Similar trends have been detected in Indonesia, where officials suspect growing linkages between al Qaeda and indigenous groups such as Laskar Jihad. In December 2001, the head of Indonesia's intellig ence services, Abdullah Hendropriyono, asserted that al Qaeda and other international terrorist organizations were attempting to sow unrest on the Indonesian island of Sulawesi by promoting inter-ethnic violence between Muslims and Christians. He also confirmed that al Qaeda and other international groups had used the territory as a base and training site for international terrorist operations. (20)