Transnational terrorism and the al Qaeda model: Confronting new realities

Parameters, Summer, 2002 by Paul J. Smith

The attack on Commander Massoud is remarkable not simply because of its tactical value for al Qaeda--it took away the Northern Alliance's most capable leader--but also because it highlighted the efficacy of suicide techniques that al Qaeda has increasingly come to rely upon. Suicide terrorism is defined as "the readiness to sacrifice one's life in the process of destroying or attempting to destroy a target to advance a political goal." (30) The difference between a brave combat soldier and a suicide bomber is that the former confronts his fears of death, hoping to avoid its clutches. The suicide bomber, on the other hand, intends to die. If somehow the suicide attacker survived the attack, yet successfully conducted the terrorist operation, he would most likely consider himself a failure.

Before the 11 September attacks, experts generally considered suicide bombers to be usually poor, not particularly well-educated, unmarried, and hungry for revenge. (31) The 11 September suicide attacks, conducted by well-educated and generally prosperous individuals, have shaken that profile. Additionally, Israeli security agents have discovered growing discrepancies to the general suicide bomber profile, such as increased incidence of educated or prosperous attackers. (32) In January 2002, Israel encountered another surprise in the profile of suicide bombers when a 28-year-old Palestinian woman named Wafa Idris blew herself up in a crowded shopping district in downtown Jerusalem. No longer could Israeli security forces concentrate their anti-bombing surveillance exclusively on Palestinian men.

If the 11 September attacks are any guide, al Qaeda or its affiliate groups will increasingly rely on suicide attacks. The method has an array of advantages over more traditional warfare. One Israeli-based analyst enumerates four major points: it is simple and inexpensive; it almost certainly guarantees mass casualties and extensive damage because the bomber can choose the exact time, location, and circumstances of the attack; there are no post-attack fears of interrogation since the attacker will almost certainly die; and it has a powerful effect on the public and the media, due to the widespread horror and sense of helplessness that it cultivates. (33)

Al Qaeda's reliance on suicide attacks has become a key part of its arsenal, particularly in recent years. Prominent al Qaeda suicide attacks have included the bombing of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the bombing of USS Cole in October 2000. Al Qaeda's interest in airborne suicide attacks is significant not only because of the 11 September attacks and Oplan Bojinka, but also because of other attacks that were either disrupted or thwarted while in progress.

In 1994, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), an al Qaeda affiliate, hijacked an Air France Airbus A300 and flew it to France with the intent of exploding the airplane in the air over Paris. The plane first landed in Marseille for refueling. There French commandos raided the plane, killing all of the hijackers. (34) In 1999, US intelligence officials reportedly received evidence suggesting that Osama bin Laden was planning to blow up at least six airliners at six international airports simultaneously. The 1999 interception of Ahmed Ressam along the US-Canada border by an astute US Customs officer probably thwarted an airport attack in late 1999. Although it is not clear that these planned attacks involved suicide tactics, most likely al Qaeda would have used such tactics if they would have ensured success.