Transnational terrorism and the al Qaeda model: Confronting new realities

Parameters, Summer, 2002 by Paul J. Smith

Identity fraud and illegal migration have emerged as the lifeblood of global terrorism, as critical as any bomb, machine gun, or grenade. Terrorist organizations place a premium on clandestine international mobility, relying on an array of identity fraud techniques. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the physician-terrorist considered to be Osama bin Laden's second-in-command, is known to have carried a "bewildering variety of passports" that, among other things, allowed him to secretly enter the United States in the early 1990s to raise funds from California mosques in order to support terrorist activities of the Egyptian group al Jihad. (40) In another case, Philippine police in early 2002 arrested a 31-year-old Indonesian man, Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, who was implicated in a plot to bomb the US Embassy in Singapore, after he was discovered carrying at least four fake or forged passports, including ones issued by the governments of Indonesia and the Philippines. (41) Officials determined that the man, a well-known bomb spec ialist for the terror group Jemaah Islamiah, had relied on these passports--which used various aliases--to travel throughout Southeast Asia to coordinate different cells of the group in preparation for a series of attacks. Similar patterns have emerged with other terrorist and transnational crime organizations around the world. (42)

Just as the illicit transnational migration of people can pose security challenges for the United States or other countries, so too can the flow of commercial cargo. Every year, the United States receives over 5.8 million containers from maritime sources, and over 2.1 million rail cars. (43) Facing the daunting task of inspecting these cargo units is the US Customs Service, which can inspect only about five percent of this international cargo, because of personnel constraints. In one border-crossing area along the US-Canada border, there are only eight primary inspection lanes and customs inspectors typically have only two minutes to inspect each tractor-trailer. (44) Moreover, because cargo can enter the United States and not be inspected for up to 30 days--due to "port of entry" procedures that allow inspection only in the final destination city--US authorities have little basis to verify the identity of the sender or the identity of the contents of thousands of multi-ton containers traveling throughout the United States on trains, trucks, or barges. (45)

In the context of international terrorism, the lack of rigorous cargo inspection procedures makes the United States and other Western countries extremely vulnerable to mass-casualty attacks by terrorist groups and other nonstate actors. Terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda could theoretically attempt to smuggle a nuclear or chemical weapon into the United States within the normal stream of cargo imports in order to conduct a mass-casualty attack. It is well-known that al Qaeda has sought to develop nuclear and chemical weapon capability. It is also documented that al Qaeda has sought to exploit the global container traffic stream in at least one case. In October 2001, Italian authorities discovered an al Qaeda operative locked inside a shipping container destined for Canada. The container was fitted with a bed and bathroom. The Egyptian national who was traveling in the container was also found to be carrying airport maps, airport security passes, and a mechanic's certificate. (46)