Transnational terrorism and the al Qaeda model: Confronting new realities

Parameters, Summer, 2002 by Paul J. Smith

The most devastating scenario would involve the smuggling of nuclear weapons via shipping containers. A recent Central Intelligence Agency report suggests that non-missile delivery of a nuclear device by state or non-state actors is the most likely means through which the United States is likely to suffer a nuclear, chemical, or biological attack. Such groups would likely deploy such devices not through missiles, but through smuggling aboard ships, trucks, airplanes, or other means. The CIA report lists various advantages for such a method, including the ability to deploy the weapon covertly, the ability to mask the source of the weapon (to evade retaliation), the ability to ensure that the weapon was used effectively at the intended location, and the ability to evade missile or other defenses. The report argued that "foreign nonstate actors--including terrorist, insurgent, or extremist groups--have used, possessed, or expressed an interest in CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear] materials." (47) Al Qaeda is among such groups. (48) Clearly, in light of such threats, border security takes on much greater urgency, although it is not clear that this understanding has reached traditional military or security planning circles.

The Dilemma of State Responses to Terrorism

In the early hours of Sunday, 14 October 2001, Abdel Rahman Hamad, having just completed morning prayers, stood on the rooftop of his house and gazed at the surrounding vista. As he leaned against a wall on the edge of his roof, two bullets fired by an Israeli government sharpshooter traveled more than 300 yards and penetrated Hamad's chest, killing him almost instantly. (49) The assassination capped many months of Israeli surveillance of Hamad. Abdel Rahman Hamad was a high-ranking leader of Hamas and was the chief suspect behind the June 2001 suicide bombing at a Tel Aviv disco that had killed 21 people only four months earlier.

The assassination, coming just a few weeks after the 11 September attacks in the United States, elicited an awkward response from Washington. On one hand, the United States, which had publicly discussed its own desire to kill Osama bin Laden, attempted to present a neutral position, cautioning the Israeli government against the employment of its "targeted killing" program. The United States, after all, was in the midst of a debate over its own self-imposed ban against overseas assassinations. Many political leaders were calling for an end to the policy, while others argued that such a policy change was unnecessary since, they reasoned, killing individuals in a lawful use of force--in this case self-defense--is not assassination. Presumably Israel could have relied on the same logic, since Hamad was a known Hamas manager who was preparing suicide bombers for future missions involving the murder of Israeli civilians and widespread destruction of property.

The Hamad assassination also provides another useful insight relevant to state responses to terrorism. If there is anything to be learned from the "war on terror"--whether conducted by the United States, Israel, or France--it should be that it is a form of warfare that is dark, morally ambiguous, and replete with dirty tricks. Spurred by sudden intelligence insights, whether from human or technological sources, states will be presented with time-sensitive opportunities to deploy special forces (or similar types of military or paramilitary units) to inflict deadly results upon individuals or entire organizations. Israel's model of targeted killings--albeit not entirely successful--may emerge as the norm in future warfare, which will likely be quiet, bloody, and murderous.